從美國的安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)、全錄公司(Xerox)，義大利的帕瑪列(Parmalat)，相關專業機構包括安達信(Arthur Andersen)、美林證券(Merrill Lynch)、花旗銀行(Citibank)；到臺灣的太電、博達、訊碟….等，一連串上市公司及專業機構爆發財務弊案，投資大眾人心惶惶。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待，但弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑。因此，一般而言，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，會計師姓名就會與「審計品質不佳」劃上等號，因此先前由被懲處之會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而提升會計師之審計品質？被懲戒之會計師是否真代表其審計品質較低？則無法得知，此即為本研究欲探討的議題。
本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度大小將會計師之審計品質予以量化，並參考Nagy(2005)的研究模式，將樣本分為會計師更換前後期，並對獨立及配對樣本作分析，以探討因懲戒而更換會計師對審計品質之影響。研究結果發現，在更換會計師的前提下，即便懲戒更換會計師並未能顯著抑制公司對於正向裁決性應計數之報導幅度，卻能避免一般情況下更換會計師對審計品質所造成的負面情形。另外，研究結果顯示，會計師長任期(6年以上)審計品質較高；會計師短任期(2年以下)且更動過於頻繁的情況下審計品質較低。在懲戒程度與審計品質之關係方面，研究結果顯示，會計師懲戒輕重程度未與會計師審計品質高低一致；而受警告及申誡懲戒但未被客戶更換之會計師在懲戒後次期，傾向調低公司盈餘，查核工作態度變保守，但審計品質並未提升。再者，本研究發現，受懲戒而更換會計師之效果大致而言並不受客戶談判籌碼的影響。最後，就單一時點(PC=0)的會計師審計品質而言，會計師被懲戒與否其審計品質並未有顯著不同；然將樣本群組進行分析後，發現有三位至四位被懲戒會計師其審計品質顯著不佳，而被懲戒之會計師中，即使差異未達顯著，卻是幾乎每2人就有1人審計品質較一般會計師低，因此懲戒制度基本上具適當性。基於以上發現，本研究肯定會計師懲戒制度對審計品質提升之效用。
總而言之，懲戒制度在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要。然其制度設立之適當性，可由懲戒制度實施案例之相關研究略知一二，主管機關應參考學者研究，找出目前會計師懲戒制度效用不彰的癥結點，進行改善，以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / rom USA to Taiwan, lots of frauds upset investors in recent years. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure to make decisions. However, with so many frauds broke up, accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality are being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators’ administrative power. Nevertheless, does the sanction system actually protect or enhance accountants’ audit quality as it is originally set up for？Do the punished accountants really provide lower quality on the audit they perform? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study.
The study quantifies accountants’ audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals of the financial statements of their audit clients. Referring to the research model of Nagy(2005), we classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants. Moreover, the study matches each observation sample with a paired sample and analyzes whether the sanction has affected the audit quality. The study concludes that the sanction system is appropriate basically. The results approve that the accountant sanction system in Taiwan is somewhat effective on improving audit quality.
In short, the purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts others. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to these findings and solve the problems that diminish the effect of the sanction system. After all, the sanction system may be able to offer investors a more matured investment environment and achieve their expectations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0093353036 |
| Creators | 鄧佳俐, Teng, Chia Lee |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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