在國內外陸續爆發財務報表舞弊案件(如安隆、博達等)後，我國主管機關透過增修各項規範(如會計師法、上市上櫃公司治理實務守則等)以及準強制性會計師輪調的實施，加強會計師的法律責任與獨立性，期許能確保會計師的審計品質，並保障投資人的權益，維護資本市場的健全。 在文獻回顧中發現，會計師的任期對審計品質的影響，目前尚未有較一致的看法；有學者主張強制性會計師輪調下，繼任會計師需付出較高的審計初始成本，且因對產業及公司之不熟悉，導致繼任會計師於審計初始任期時，審計品質反而較前任會計師低落。我國遭受懲戒會計師之審計品質較未受懲戒會計師低，但會計師遭受停業懲戒後，繼任會計師並未能對審計品質有所改善。本研究欲探討企業歷經會計師遭受停業而被迫必須予以更換下，繼任會計師在更換初期及擔任較長任期後的審計品質，相較原任會計師的審計品質是否有差異。 本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度作為衡量審計品質的代理變數，參考相關文獻建立研究模型，並以台灣金管會證期局於民國96年公佈之近5年會計師懲戒名單為基準樣本，找出受懲戒會計師之客戶公司為觀察樣本，分析當企業因原任會計師受懲戒被停業或除名而必須更換會計師時，繼任會計師是否能改善原任會計師較差的審計品質，結果並未能發現繼任會計師審計品質相較原任會計師有顯著改善的證據。本研究進一步分析所內繼任會計師(相對初始成本較低、但獨立性亦較低)及所外繼任會計師(相對初始成本較高、但獨立性亦較高)間，審計品質改善是否有所差異，結果未能發現兩者有顯著的差異。 / From USA to Taiwan, lots of financial scandals have disheartened investors in recent years. For the purpose of improving audit quality of financial reports and protecting interests of the investing public, regulators in Taiwan instituted new rules and implemented a “quasi-forced CPA rotation system” to enhance auditors’ legal responsibility and independence. In literature review, findings about the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality are not all consistent. Under forced CPA rotation, because of the necessary higher start-up cost and unfamiliarity of client business, succeeding auditor’s audit quality is often lower than the predecessor. Prior studies find the audit quality of sanctioned CPAs to be lower than those not sanctioned, and their succeeding auditors who replace CPAs whose licenses’ are suspended can not improve the audit quality significantly. The purpose of this study is to investigate the difference between the audit quality of predecessor CPAS, who are under temporary suspension of license and that of their successor auditors both at the initial stage of the change several years afterwards. ABSDA is the proxy of audit quality in this study, and a model based on literature to date is developed. This study uses the CPA sanction cases posted on the website of the Securities and Futures Bureau (SFB). The client firms whose CPAs were sanctioned by regulatory authorities during the part five years are taken as samples in the research. The empirical tests find that succeeding CPAs can’t significantly improve the audit quality subsequent to the change. Moreover, the study tests if the succeeding CPAs from the same firm of the predecessor CPA can make greater improvement on audit quality than succeeding CPAs from another firm can. The findings show no significant difference between those two either.

本文主要換討SOX之後宣告重編公司之經濟後果。探討如下議題:(1)信用評等是否/如何反應公司的重編資訊;(2)重編內涵與經理人異動之關聯性;(3)經理人異動、信用評等改變以及重編嚴重性三者之關聯性。 / Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the increasing occurrence of accounting restatements has drawn considerable attention concerning the financial statement quality and adverse consequences of accounting restatements from investors, regulators, auditors and business communities. The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the economic consequences of accounting restatements announced after SOX based on their relations with credit ratings and management turnover. To examine the following research issues of (1) whether and how the credit rating reacts to companies’ restatements, (2) whether restatement characteristics are associated with management turnover, and (3) what the association among management turnover, credit ratings, and restatement severity is, I gather data on 1,838 companies that restated financial statements between 1997 and 2005. In the first part of the study, my results provide empirical evidence consistent with the conjecture that higher severity restatements are more likely to be followed by subsequent unfavorable ratings. Furthermore, rating agencies using accounting-based measures to predict the probability of bankruptcy perform better in assessing ratings in the post-SOX period. Moreover, rating agencies give auditor changes a “fresh-look” after SOX. In the second part of the study, the likelihood of CEO/CFO turnover significantly increases for companies with higher restatements of severity, and a CEO is more likely to be terminated if the company credit rating following restatements is downgraded. The results show that there is no “cop a plea” effect and when restatements are prompted by companies, management turnover appears to be more concerned with the dollar amount of overstatement on income and/or restatements affecting core earnings. In addition, when executives window-dress earnings to portray a more favorable earnings picture, they are more likely to be terminated following subsequent financial restatements. Moreover, results also indicate that after SOX companies seem more likely to blame their auditors for restatements of higher severity and dismiss their auditors afterwards to maybe avoid the replacements of management.

從美國的安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)、全錄公司(Xerox)，義大利的帕瑪列(Parmalat)，相關專業機構包括安達信(Arthur Andersen)、美林證券(Merrill Lynch)、花旗銀行(Citibank)；到臺灣的太電、博達、訊碟….等，一連串上市公司及專業機構爆發財務弊案，投資大眾人心惶惶。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待，但弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑。因此，一般而言，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，會計師姓名就會與「審計品質不佳」劃上等號，因此先前由被懲處之會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而提升會計師之審計品質？被懲戒之會計師是否真代表其審計品質較低？則無法得知，此即為本研究欲探討的議題。 本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度大小將會計師之審計品質予以量化，並參考Nagy(2005)的研究模式，將樣本分為會計師更換前後期，並對獨立及配對樣本作分析，以探討因懲戒而更換會計師對審計品質之影響。研究結果發現，在更換會計師的前提下，即便懲戒更換會計師並未能顯著抑制公司對於正向裁決性應計數之報導幅度，卻能避免一般情況下更換會計師對審計品質所造成的負面情形。另外，研究結果顯示，會計師長任期(6年以上)審計品質較高；會計師短任期(2年以下)且更動過於頻繁的情況下審計品質較低。在懲戒程度與審計品質之關係方面，研究結果顯示，會計師懲戒輕重程度未與會計師審計品質高低一致；而受警告及申誡懲戒但未被客戶更換之會計師在懲戒後次期，傾向調低公司盈餘，查核工作態度變保守，但審計品質並未提升。再者，本研究發現，受懲戒而更換會計師之效果大致而言並不受客戶談判籌碼的影響。最後，就單一時點(PC=0)的會計師審計品質而言，會計師被懲戒與否其審計品質並未有顯著不同；然將樣本群組進行分析後，發現有三位至四位被懲戒會計師其審計品質顯著不佳，而被懲戒之會計師中，即使差異未達顯著，卻是幾乎每2人就有1人審計品質較一般會計師低，因此懲戒制度基本上具適當性。基於以上發現，本研究肯定會計師懲戒制度對審計品質提升之效用。 總而言之，懲戒制度在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要。然其制度設立之適當性，可由懲戒制度實施案例之相關研究略知一二，主管機關應參考學者研究，找出目前會計師懲戒制度效用不彰的癥結點，進行改善，以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / rom USA to Taiwan, lots of frauds upset investors in recent years. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure to make decisions. However, with so many frauds broke up, accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality are being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators’ administrative power. Nevertheless, does the sanction system actually protect or enhance accountants’ audit quality as it is originally set up for？Do the punished accountants really provide lower quality on the audit they perform? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study. The study quantifies accountants’ audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals of the financial statements of their audit clients. Referring to the research model of Nagy(2005), we classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants. Moreover, the study matches each observation sample with a paired sample and analyzes whether the sanction has affected the audit quality. The study concludes that the sanction system is appropriate basically. The results approve that the accountant sanction system in Taiwan is somewhat effective on improving audit quality. In short, the purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts others. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to these findings and solve the problems that diminish the effect of the sanction system. After all, the sanction system may be able to offer investors a more matured investment environment and achieve their expectations.