Don Fallis and Andreas Stokke propose that the classical definition of lying is inadequate due to the insistence on deceptive doxastic goals. Such goals have been proven problematic in the light of baldface lying. Both Fallis and Stokke argue that baldface lying are actual instances of lying and that a valid definition of lying should therefore include these. They suggest that lies be understood in a pragmatic framework and ground their definitions in the linguistic tradition following Paul Grice and Robert Stalnaker, respectively. Lies are to be understood as conscious breaches of pragmatic maxims. In this essay I show that Fallis project fails due to limitations inherent to Grice theory of communication. Andreas Stokke definition, on the other hand, building on the work of Jonathan Cohen and Robert Stalnaker, turns out to be a beautiful explication of the classical definition of lying – that besides managing the extensional problem that baldface lies pose also succeeds in making them intelligible epistemically. However, I argue that his categorical rejection of a necessary deceptive condition is refuted by his own definition and theoretical build up. Contrary to Stokke’s own conviction, I thus maintain that his contribution be understood as a significant vindication of the deceptive theory of lying. Finally, lies told by young children seem to pose as great a problem for non-deceptive theories of lying as baldface lies did for deceptive theories.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-466027 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Kharchi Hagland, Peter Josef |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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