This essay argues that cannibalism is not inherently immoral. To demonstrate this, I have analyzed the ethics of cannibalism through the perspective of consent, rights, autonomy, and consumption of flesh. I have defined the concepts of cannibalism and morality. The case of the German Cannibal Armin Meiwes is used throughout the essay as it gives factual examples of a case where cannibalism is in accordance to consent. I have analyzed cannibalism as a taboo, in the ways this taboo has formed and how we differentiate cannibalism in humans and nonhumans. Following this I have demonstrated how the relations surrounding human rights, the law's interpretation of consent and autonomy can alter its morality. With discussing consumption of flesh, whether it be from an animal or a human being, followed by how our view on treating nonanimals as a means to an end, I illustrate a comparison to cannibalism in human beings. By exploring the relationship of cannibalism with morality through these theories I conclude that cannibalism in fact cannot be inherently immoral.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:liu-183991 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Blomberg, Rebecca |
| Publisher | Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och samhälle |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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