Alliance affiliation in the cyber domain – Asset or affliction? ABSTRACT: The aim of this study is to better understand the impact of alliance membership and the possible deterrence effect it has in the cyber domain. The problem with achieving deterrence in cyberspace is to be able to measure its efficiency when there is a constant occurrence of cyber-attacks that are perceived under the threshold of armed attack but above what constitutes a peaceful coexistence. A hegemonic status in the international system attracts interest and motive to affect from other actors’ ads to the problem when alliances are formed. Data has been extracted from multiple sources to be able to test through regression if the number of alliances have a deterrent effect, if signaling of offensive capabilities can dampen the will to attack and if the promise of al-lied retribution influences the number of cyber-attacks. The result shows that deterrence through alliances at best has a marginal effect. The strongest deterrent is being a member of an alliance that promises retaliation if attacked and that military might attract aggressors to use the cyber domain to affect their opponent. This means that membership in a defensive alliance has an insignificant deterrent effect and rising military capability can neutralize the wanted benefits of the alliance in the cyber domain.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-12515 |
Date | January 2024 |
Creators | Swiecicki, Simon |
Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | Swedish |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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