Alliance affiliation in the cyber domain – Asset or affliction? ABSTRACT: The aim of this study is to better understand the impact of alliance membership and the possible deterrence effect it has in the cyber domain. The problem with achieving deterrence in cyberspace is to be able to measure its efficiency when there is a constant occurrence of cyber-attacks that are perceived under the threshold of armed attack but above what constitutes a peaceful coexistence. A hegemonic status in the international system attracts interest and motive to affect from other actors’ ads to the problem when alliances are formed. Data has been extracted from multiple sources to be able to test through regression if the number of alliances have a deterrent effect, if signaling of offensive capabilities can dampen the will to attack and if the promise of al-lied retribution influences the number of cyber-attacks. The result shows that deterrence through alliances at best has a marginal effect. The strongest deterrent is being a member of an alliance that promises retaliation if attacked and that military might attract aggressors to use the cyber domain to affect their opponent. This means that membership in a defensive alliance has an insignificant deterrent effect and rising military capability can neutralize the wanted benefits of the alliance in the cyber domain.

This thesis attempts to explain why some domestic crises escalate to internationalized civil war, while others do not. Existing research on unilateral intervention in civil war does not pay sufficient attention to the dyadic nature of conflict, and the decision by an actor to resist intervention. Jack Snyder’s (1991) theory of Great Power “regime cartelization” is here adapted to explain why some transitional regimes in small states are less susceptible to immediate, extended deterrence by external actors that support separatist domestic challengers. Cartelized regimes are transitional regimes with relatively weak democratic institutions, and executive decision making influenced by nationalist ideology. The main claim of this thesis is that regime cartelization is positively related to the onset of internationalized civil war, given that secondary party support to the domestic challenger is staunch. This is because cartelized regimes prefer the cost of war over the audience cost of backing down from a contestation. A comparative, qualitative case study of two domestic crises in Georgia 2004-2008, and two domestic crises in Ukraine 2014-2016 supports this claim.