abstract: I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:44294 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Contributors | Hernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author), Manelli, Alejandro (Advisor), Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member), Chade, Hector (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 151 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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