Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that
subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective
relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with
which it enters into a relation.
As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II
of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of
intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot
give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the
abovementioned intuition.
The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s
Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an
attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology,
since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of
the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other
because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same.
We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both
of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better
account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl),
neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in
phenomenology and its focus on consciousness.
In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker,
namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide
the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the
constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution
of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject.
Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the
relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these
terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of
knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular
events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in
distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology,
there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is
therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one
that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the
subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of
relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of
“ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/1998 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Hugo, Johan |
| Contributors | Cilliers, F. P., University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Rights | University of Stellenbosch |
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