In this dissertation, I criticize current approaches to moral cognition research and develop an embodied account of moral cognizing. Contemporary research into moral cognizing is strongly influenced by an orthodox cognitive mindset. Modern approaches to cognitive science, especially situated, i.e., embodied-enacted, approaches emphasize the role of affectivity, emotions, bodily experiences, sociality, culture, interpersonal relationship, and dynamic interactions in human cognizing. However, these non-orthodox approaches have only occasionally been applied to the study of the moral mind. The embodied account defended analyzes moral actions in terms of an agent's engagement with the world. Agents acquire a repertoire of possible interactions with the world rooted in their sensorimotor expertise. This embodied view of moral action focuses on the role culture, sociality, and interpersonal relations play in contextualizing actions and constituting an agent's identity. Enactive theory provides a broader cognitive framework to understand embodied action and moral identity, overcoming the dominant logic of doing and being done to, opening up moral agency to a sphere of joint action.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uni-osnabrueck.de/oai:repositorium.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de:urn:nbn:de:gbv:700-202108045233 |
| Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Creators | Bergmann, Lasse Tenzin |
| Contributors | Prof. Achim Stephan, Prof. Sven Walter |
| Source Sets | Universität Osnabrück |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | doc-type:doctoralThesis |
| Format | application/pdf, application/zip |
| Rights | Attribution 3.0 Germany, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/de/ |
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