<p>The paper deals with the problem of the moral status of human embryos <em>in vitro</em> obtained via somatic cell nuclear transfer, <em>in vitro</em> fertilization and similar biotechnologies. The purpose of research is to investigate whether it is possible to ascribe the position of full moral status to the embryo <em>in vitro</em> relying on its intrinsic properties. In particular, the property of totipotency of a human zygote was taken as presupposition in carrying out further moral assessments. To achieve these goals I have examined the applicability of the potentiality argument for evaluating moral status of the embryo within the frameworks of modal logic. The potential of the human embryo to become a person with full-fledged number of moral rights was interpreted using real, dispositional and counterfactual predicates. It was found that the role of potentiality argument is reduced to a precautionary principle and it failed to provide full moral status to the embryo <em>in vitro</em>. The potential of the embryo proper has a strong relational component that assigns it certain instrumental value. The latter implies that biomedical experimentation with the embryos <em>in vitro</em> cannot be considered as morally unacceptable.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:liu-57542 |
| Date | January 2010 |
| Creators | Artemenko, Oleg |
| Publisher | Linköping University, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
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