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Realism, not relativism : a critique of Gilbert Harman

This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of
moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending
a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the
anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist
conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal
belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman
may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the
very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove
that relativism is false, and realism true.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:BVAU.2429/14987
Date05 1900
CreatorsRawlings, Adam D.H.
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
RelationUBC Retrospective Theses Digitization Project [http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/retro_theses/]

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