This essay explores the rules of adjustment of compensation for wrongful imprisonment as applied to juveniles aged 15–18 from a child law perspective. The Law of Compensation for Wrongful Deprivation of Liberty[1] excludes claims where the complainant has contributed to causing the deprivation, for instance through false confessions or other suspicious behavior. There are no exceptions for those who exhibited such behavior while they were underage. There is also no other guidance or precedent for special treatment of such cases with regard to the level of responsibility for the damages, although children are generally awarded a somewhat larger sum than adults. This essay considers the rules of exclusion in light of child rights, material laws concerning children in the justice system, as well as tort law principles regarding participation in causing damages to oneself. The purpose is to investigate whether there would be cause to change the law to include separate rules for children. The essay finds that preferential treatment of children is the rule rather than the exception, both in the criminal justice system, in torts, as well as with regard to the ability to enter agreements. This is mainly motivated by children's inability to take responsibility for their actions. Adults, commonly the child's parents or other legal guardians, but also representatives of the state, are to varying degrees tasked with taking responsibility for children and to protect them not only from others – but from themselves. The essay also finds that the cause of the damage, the deprivation of liberty, is different when it occurs during childhood, because: · Children are officially not punished for their crimes; their deprivation of liberty is defined as receiving care. · The treatment children receive through the criminal justice system is more psychologically damaging to them than prison sentences are to adults and has far-reaching consequences regarding their development. · The state has greater responsibility for children than for adults. · The nature of the fundamental rights violated through the confinement are different, as children do not fully have the same freedom as adults, and because they have rights which adults do not have. After considering a range of legal and non-legal factors, it would be reasonable and consistent to regulate children's claims to compensation for wrongful deprivation of liberty more preferentially. The state has a responsibility for the welfare and healthy development of children in general, as well as a duty to ensure that children are not being deprived of their liberty unless it is necessary to do so, according to article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which holds a status as Swedish law since January 2020.[2] Research has shown young age and life adversity to be clear risk factors for falsely confessing to a crime. This should merit some caution on the side of the state when handling confessions from young people; especially when adult family members or friends could be suspected of the same crime. The very unequal power balance between the child and the state in that context should be reflected in the rules of adjustment of compensation. Another important issue with the current legislation is that children are unable to apply for the compensation without the signature(s) of their legal guardian(s), which has not been compensated for with regard to prescription. This is the case for various damage claims of children against the state. Thus, children are offered a shorter time than adults to personally claim compensation. The essay also considers whether an individual could claim this type of preferential treatment more directly based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Results in this regard are inconclusive. Importantly, while there may be reasons both for and against any changes, it is clear from the seriousness of the subject matter that such reasons should be explored and considered by the lawmaker. [1] Lag (1998:714) om ersättning för felaktigt frihetsberövande (My translation. No official English translation appears to be available.)[2] Although originally ratified in 1989.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-214465 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | Sjölin, Celeste |
| Publisher | Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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