This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of
moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending
a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the
anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist
conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal
belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman
may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the
very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove
that relativism is false, and realism true.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:BVAU.2429/14987 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Rawlings, Adam D.H. |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Relation | UBC Retrospective Theses Digitization Project [http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/retro_theses/] |
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