This paper examines how precision resources, such as Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), can affect the OODA loop decision making cycle. PGMs add precision and force to kinetic strikes, whilst UASs bring precision and endurance to the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) field. The research is conducted as a qualitative case study with two cases - the first one being Operation Desert Storm (1991) where precision weapons were first introduced in a large scale operation, and the second one being Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) which was conducted in a similar environment and organization, but with a huge technological advancement when it came to PGMs and UASs. The four phases of the OODA loop are examined separately, and the two cases are compared to reveal any similarities or differences. The results indicate that precision resources have a beneficial impact on the speed and accuracy of all four phases, as well as the overall efficiency of the OODA loop. The results also indicate the importance of having sound intelligence (which cements John Boyd’s claim that Orientation is the most important part of the loop) and that the next challenge after precision and ISR-capabilities might be successful coordination of the joint forces on tactical and operational levels to gain speed even further.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-9225 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Langhard, Jessie |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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