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Previous issue date: 2014-10-13 / The central theme of this thesis is inserted in the literature which investigates the logic of power relations between the executive and legislative powers in the sub-national sphere, and in particular, on how the paradox of governability is solved in Brazilian states. Seeking a better understanding on how parties unite in coalitions, the thesis analyses the assembly and the nature of government coalitions (Cabinet formations), investigating, in particular, the weight and role of cabinets in the formation and maintenance of executive support by the legislative chamber of the state of São Paulo, from 1995 to 2010. The empirical study finds that differently from the federal sphere, the formation of São Paulo’s cabinets aim mostly at electoral strategies and that the governors’ formed and maintained coalitions are not totally explained by the government focused coalitions. Government coalitions essentially represent minor parties, and generally only allieds are appointed as secretaries of state, not proportionally to the legislative support, with the majority of roles being offered to the governor’s party. The formation and management of legislative coalitions are accomplished through the offer of coalition tools and pork barrels, such as 2nd and 3rd tier appointments, monetary transfers, and investments in legislative members’ electoral districts. The legislative members’ governist behavior is justified by the lack of alternative for political survival, derived from the current conditions, which include restrictions or lack of institutional incentives, such as: Diminished state competencies, major matters being exclusive to the executive power, Legistative carrier strategy derived from the proportional open-list electoral system, among others. The thesis contributes to the stream of empirical studies about coalition presidentialism, bringing elements on the cabinet formation and long term coalition management. / O tema central desta Tese insere-se na preocupação da literatura acerca da lógica das relações de poder entre Executivo e legislativo na esfera subnacional, em particular, como é solucionado o dilema da governabilidade nos estados brasileiros. Buscando compreender o que une os partidos na coalizão, a Tese analisa a montagem e a natureza da coalizão de governo (formação dos gabinetes), investigando, em particular, seu peso e papel na construção e na gestão do apoio ao Executivo pela Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo (coalizão legislativa), no caso do estado de São Paulo, de 1995 a 2010. O estudo empírico verifica que, diferentemente da esfera federal, a formação dos gabinetes paulistas visam prioritariamente estratégias eleitorais e as coalizões de governo não correspondem à totalidade das coalizões legislativas formadas e mantidas pelos governadores, já que, via de regra, os gabinetes são minoritários, geralmente somente os aliados coligados recebem Secretarias, sem observar a proporcionalidade do apoio oferecido no Legislativo, e as pastas são majoritariamente concentradas para o partido do governador. A formação e gestão da coalizão legislativa, por sua vez, é realizada mediante a oferta de moedas e políticas do tipo pork barrels, a exemplo de cargos do segundo e terceiro escalões, transferências e investimentos nos redutos eleitorais dos parlamentares, cujo comportamento governista se justifica pela falta de alternativa à sobrevivência política derivada das restrições ou incentivos institucionais: reduzidas competências estaduais; iniciativa exclusiva do Executivo nas principais matérias; e, lógica de carreira derivada do sistema eleitoral proporcional de lista aberta, dentre outras. A Tese contribui para a vertente de estudos empíricos sobre o presidencialismo de coalizão e ultrapresidencialismo estadual, trazendo elementos tanto sobre a formação dos gabinetes quanto sobre o gerenciamento da coalizão ao longo do tempo.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/12382 |
| Date | 13 October 2014 |
| Creators | Massonetto, Ana Paula |
| Contributors | Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves, Avelino Filho, George, Tomio, Fabricio Ricardo de Limas, Costa, Valeriano Mendes Ferreira, Escolas::EAESP, Abrucio, Fernando Luiz |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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