This dissertation investigates the economic consequences from hedge accounting signals and risk management disclosure. I first examine the product market consequences to these accounting signals and related disclosure in Chapter 1, then stock market reactions to disclosure requirements in Chapter 2.
Chapter 1 examines potential entrants’ strategic entry decisions in response to incumbents’ accounting information and related disclosure. I predict that potential entrants are more likely to enter markets in which the incumbents’ accounting information suggests higher future production costs that are specific to the incumbents themselves. I further hypothesize that the relation is stronger when the accounting signals are accompanied by more disclosure. Using detailed U.S. airline industry data and hedge accounting disclosure under SFAS 133, I find that potential entrants are more likely to enter routes in which the incumbents’ lower accumulated other comprehensive income from fuel hedges suggests their higher future production costs. This entry pattern is stronger when incumbents have more transparent annual report disclosure regarding their fuel hedge programs. The entry pattern is also stronger after a systematic increase in risk management disclosure requirements following the (exogenous) adoption of SFAS 161.
Chapter 2 analyzes stock returns of U.S. airlines around events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. SFAS 161 enhanced the disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities. I find that U.S. airlines experienced statistically significant positive returns around the key events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. I then examine the cross-sectional variation of the returns around these events. Regression results provide initial support for the real effects theory that greater disclosure requirements could distort firms’ hedging and production decisions and lead to suboptimal behavior.
In summary, this dissertation provides evidence that competitors use hedge accounting signals and related disclosure in making product market decisions. Meanwhile, additional risk-management disclosures may also distort firms’ hedging and production behavior, leading to suboptimal decisions. This dissertation sheds light on the ongoing projects by the FASB and the IASB on hedge accounting and disclosure and informs the regulators that costs and benefits should be weighted in hedge accounting policy setting.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/43767 |
Date | 14 January 2014 |
Creators | Zou, Youli |
Contributors | Hope, Ole-Kristian |
Source Sets | University of Toronto |
Language | en_ca |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
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