My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in
favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the
“infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalam cosmological argument. Concerning
the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of
God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important
role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter
claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable
theistic argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the
proponents of the kalam cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity
cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims
that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an
actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this
problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2)
the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NWUBOLOKA1/oai:dspace.nwu.ac.za:10394/11024 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Erasmus, Jacobus Petrus |
| Source Sets | North-West University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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