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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Object / Jacobus Petrus Erasmus

Erasmus, Jacobus Petrus January 2014 (has links)
My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the “infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalam cosmological argument. Concerning the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable theistic argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalam cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2) the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
2

The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Object / Jacobus Petrus Erasmus

Erasmus, Jacobus Petrus January 2014 (has links)
My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the “infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalam cosmological argument. Concerning the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable theistic argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalam cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2) the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
3

Cosmic Skepticism and the Beginning of Physical Reality

Daniel J Linford (12883550) 16 June 2022 (has links)
<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>

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