- About
-
The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
Search results
Showing 1 to 5 of 5 (0.087 seconds)| 1 |
The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Object / Jacobus Petrus ErasmusErasmus, Jacobus Petrus January 2014 (has links)
My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in
favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the
“infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalam cosmological argument. Concerning
the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of
God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important
role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter
claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable
theistic argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the
proponents of the kalam cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity
cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims
that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an
actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this
problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2)
the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
|
| 2 |
The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Object / Jacobus Petrus ErasmusErasmus, Jacobus Petrus January 2014 (has links)
My overall claim in this paper is twofold: Firstly, the activity of developing arguments in
favour of the existence of the Christian God is tenable and worthwhile and, secondly, the
“infinite God objection” fails to undermine the kalam cosmological argument. Concerning
the former, it is often claimed that the very activity of developing arguments in favour of
God’s existence is futile. I argue, however, that such theistic arguments play an important
role in the philosophy of religion, natural theology, and apologetics. Concerning the latter
claim, I will attempt to show how the infinite God objection fails to undermine a notable
theistic argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the
proponents of the kalam cosmological argument face a dilemma – either an actual infinity
cannot exist or God’s knowledge cannot be infinite. More specifically, this objection claims
that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinity with God knowing an
actual infinite number of future events and mathematical truths. My solution to this
problem is that (1) God’s omniscience should be understood as maximal knowledge; (2)
the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers and propositions) should be denied; and (3) God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
|
| 3 |
Det nödvändiga väsendet : En filosofisk analys av det kosmologiska argumentetWernberg, Johan January 2017 (has links)
In this paper I examine the existence of God through a focus on the cosmological argument as it ispresented here. My aim is to show that this argument provides support for the existence of God. To do this I examine that which I call the three steps of the cosmological argument: the first step being the accepting of the world as an ordered something, the second step being the ultimate question why this ordered something is there to begin with and the third step being that of God viewed as the only plausible answer. I argue that the ultimate question’s claim for an ultimate answer ought to be accepted due to the inability of individual things to explain the mere existence and order of things in general, which implies that the explanation for existence and order as such is to be searched beyond those things. Regarding the third step I argue that there has to be something rather than noting and that this something is to be viewed as something living due to the orderly nature of the world. From this I, finally, argue in favor of the explanatory value of a necessary being - i.e. God.
|
| 4 |
Rethinking Causality: Thomas Aquinas' Argument From Motion & the Kalām Cosmological ArgumentSánchez, Derwin, Jr. 01 January 2020 (has links)
Ever since they were formulated in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas' famous Five Ways to demonstrate the existence of God have been frequently debated. During this process there have been several misconceptions of what Aquinas actually meant, especially when discussing his cosmological arguments. While previous researchers have managed to tease out why Aquinas accepts some infinite regresses and rejects others, I attempt to add on to this by demonstrating the centrality of his metaphysics in his argument from motion. Aquinas cannot be properly understood or debated with a contemporary view of causality, but rather must wrestle with the concepts he actually employs in the arguments. To demonstrate this, I will compare the Thomistic argument from motion to the contemporary Kalām cosmological argument of William Lane Craig. Although some may consider it beneficial to base theistic arguments on more modern principles, this analysis shows that the metaphysical framework used by Aquinas is much less vulnerable to the rebuttals that otherwise challenge the Kalām argument, and that their differences in strength rest on their differences in metaphysics.
|
| 5 |
Cosmic Skepticism and the Beginning of Physical RealityDaniel J Linford (12883550) 16 June 2022 (has links)
<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>
|
Page generated in 0.0922 seconds