從個體決策制定（decision-making）的角度觀之，參與談判、創造合約，是一種既可學習處世又可瞭解「人性」的雙贏作為。個體在歷經集體談判的互動（interaction）過程後，所獲得的償值（payoffs），也許會超越前述的期望效益；然而，對於「急需達成協議卻失敗者」或「被迫達成協議者」而言，因為無法如願以償，付出與耗損的心力，往住令人無法說服自己──這樣的結果符合吾人之期望（expectancy）──於是，個體理性（individual rationality）與集體理性（collective rationality）間的弔詭（paradox）又乍然若現。
仲裁人以中立第三者的角色，受理談判參與者的爭議，裁決爭議各造的償值，是聯結個體與集體理性的制度設計之一。然而，不同的仲裁制度所依循的特定仲裁程序，及其所隱含的偏差（bias），對交付仲裁的爭議各造及仲裁人決策模式所產生的影響，著實不容忽略。
本文的旨趣在於對仲裁制度及程序所隱含的偏差進行實驗比較，以博奕理論（game theory）為分析工具，來檢視下列三個變項所形成的二種關係：
一、在最終報價仲裁（final-offer arbitration）制度之下，仲裁人的特定偏好（preferences）對爭議兩造的影響，觀察的指標為爭議率及各造的報價策略；
二、不同仲裁制度及程序對仲裁人從事仲裁判斷之影響，觀察的指標為仲裁判斷分布（distribution of arbitration awards）。
本文的結論將藉由前述二種關係的檢證結果，來觀察「爭議兩造」、「仲裁人」及「仲裁制度」三個變項的交集點──仲裁判斷（arbitration awards）──對爭議兩造在重複競局(repeated game)中報價策略的影響，並試圖探究如何縮短個體理性與集體理性之間的落差，冀能透過制度設計來提供爭議各造誠實報價的誘因，並進一步促使仲裁人在從事判斷時能秉公處理，藉以回歸仲裁公平與專業的本質。
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| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/A2002001285 |
| Creators | 辜柏宏, Ku, Po-Hung |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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