Should classical theories about counterinsurgency remain in the past or be considered in relation to future insurgencies? Scholars have discussed the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theories earlier in this century and disagreed about how relevant the classics are. The aim with this bachelor thesis was to study if Robert Thompson's Basic Operational Concept could explain the progress U.S. troops made in the insurgency that took place in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. troops had problems controlling the insurgency but other scholars asserted that progress was made after 2006 when classical theories about counterinsurgency were applied to the emergency. This thesis has a case study design and the author used qualitative text analysis of secondary sources, including interviews and research material from RAND Corporation. The theory used was based on Thompson's Basic Operational Concept. The majority of the concept was found to have been rigorously applied after 2006 and therefore, based on the result from this thesis, should be considered as a possible rationale for the progress U.S. troops made in the emergency.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-8552 |
Date | January 2019 |
Creators | Svensson, Benjamin |
Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | Swedish |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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