Insurgencies have been a nuisance for modern armies to deal with for centuries and recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland supports that claim. Counterinsurgency theories present different solutions for the same problems and old proven theories get challenged by modern ones. Researchers therefore differ in their opinions whether the classical proven theories are still relevant to guide modern counterinsurgency. A lot of modern counterinsurgency doctrines are still heavily based on these classical theories which leads to the purpose of this study, to investigate if an old theory still can explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. A fitting theory for this goal is the British theorist Thompsons which’s influence still can be observed in modern counterinsurgency doctrines. The study’s findings indicate that an old theory such as Thompsons still contributes to explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. The analysis illuminates that the greater extent of observance according to the principles of the theory will result in a more successful counterinsurgency overall. Though further research is required to consolidate these affirmations.

Should classical theories about counterinsurgency remain in the past or be considered in relation to future insurgencies? Scholars have discussed the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theories earlier in this century and disagreed about how relevant the classics are. The aim with this bachelor thesis was to study if Robert Thompson's Basic Operational Concept could explain the progress U.S. troops made in the insurgency that took place in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. troops had problems controlling the insurgency but other scholars asserted that progress was made after 2006 when classical theories about counterinsurgency were applied to the emergency. This thesis has a case study design and the author used qualitative text analysis of secondary sources, including interviews and research material from RAND Corporation. The theory used was based on Thompson's Basic Operational Concept. The majority of the concept was found to have been rigorously applied after 2006 and therefore, based on the result from this thesis, should be considered as a possible rationale for the progress U.S. troops made in the emergency.