Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior. Using all key roll call votes in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad. Evidence does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters after uses of force abroad. But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents' abilities to influence congressional voting behavior.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc3926 |
| Date | 08 1900 |
| Creators | Ragland, James Deen |
| Contributors | Greig, Michael, Meernik, James, Oldmixon, Elizabeth |
| Publisher | University of North Texas |
| Source Sets | University of North Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | Text |
| Rights | Public, Copyright, Ragland, James Deen, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved. |
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