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ALacuna in the Self: Foresight & Forgetting in Plato’s Protagoras

Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy / If Plato’s dialogues offer recollection as a paradigm for human knowing, then, forgetfulness as the opposite of recollection, would seem to be ignorance, or the destruction of knowing. However, forgetfulness is not simply recollection’s opposite, but it also serves as its precondition; to recollect something, one must first forget it. Forgetfulness involves an absence that may re-present itself. This dual nature of forgetfulness as, on the one hand, a precondition for philosophical recollection and, on the other, characteristic of ignorance and destruction of knowledge, mirrors the experience of perplexity (ἀπορία), which can serve either as the impetus for philosophical inquiry or as the ground to foreclose any further questioning. My dissertation considers the implications of forgetting, foresight, and oversight, in Plato's Protagoras as a new way to shed light on the relationship and difference between the sophist and philosopher. I propose that both philosophy and Protagorean sophistry understand something about the nature and limits of human understanding in light of our tendency to forget. Protagorean sophistry, however, attempts to overcome human limits in its aim at perfect foresight. Protagoras ultimately capitulates to ἀπορία by refusing to inquire earnestly, thereby avoiding the problem posed by our tendency to forget. Socratic philosophy, on the other hand, cultivates and maintains ἀπορία in its recognition that forgetting is a limitation that is at once intrinsic to human understanding and the necessary occasion for learning that underlies all philosophical inquiry. Socratic foresight, in opposition to Protagorean foresight, is characterized by its recognition that ἀπορία and oversight are persistent and unavoidable conditions of all human inquiry. Rather than attempt to overcome human nature either by capitulating to or resolving ἀπορία in a definitive answer, Socratic philosophy is depicted as an aporetic way of living, which thus remains open to what is yet to be known. In this way, Socratic foresight comes to light as superior to that of Protagorean sophistry both in its self-knowledge and in its implicit affirmation of what would otherwise seem to be a mere weakness in human nature. Socratic foresight welcomes ἀπορία as the condition for all human inquiry and achievement. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:BOSTON/oai:dlib.bc.edu:bc-ir_109685
Date January 2023
CreatorsBarry, Lydia Winn
PublisherBoston College
Source SetsBoston College
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, thesis
Formatelectronic, application/pdf
RightsCopyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.

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