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This thesis acts as an exploration of the notion of an a priori aporia of the always already diminished subject as opposed to an ideal self-present individual, and explores the efforts of a selection of twentieth century continental philosophy to address the crises of scepticism and metaphysics that beset this tradition and its search for the ‘truth’ of being. I will argue that my atemporal philosophical teleology proves in fact that any attempt to determine the finitude of subjectivity represents an ineluctable desire for metaphysical comfort that can, at times, verge on totalitarianism. Furthermore, the divergent temporal loci of these theorists — and their particular attempts to address these recurrent crises — necessarily calls into question the popular perception of a temporally specific ‘postmodern condition’ afflicting the contemporary subject. Given the repeated failure of philosophical discourse to provide the subject with its raison d’être, a focus on the usefulness of literature in this regard becomes apparent within my theoretical schema, leading to a discussion of several controversial contemporary novels that parallel my proposition of the diminished subject, and refute negative perceptions of them as postmodern and valueless due to an apparent nihilistic ‘anything goes’ attitude. However, rather than resorting to naïve utopianism regarding the positive uses of literature, I argue that these texts reiterate the key theoretical propositions in this thesis with an awareness of the discursive nature of the subject and the a priori condition of the possibility of change which inevitably undermine transcendence. It is my proposition that these texts can be read as fictionalised expressions of the cathartic possibilities of literature, and an innate desire in all subjects for the metaphysics of comfort when faced with the meaninglessness of existence, something exacerbated by the recurrent failure of philosophical and religious discourses to counter the aporia of an always already absent self-presence of subjectivity.

This thesis explores the possibility of urban citizenship, focusing on the relation between the ‘urban’ and ‘citizenship’ as an expression of the problem of sovereignty. It highlights a key aspect that prevailing accounts fail to address, arguing that urban citizenship is characterized by twin logics of ‘urbanization’ and ‘citizenship’ that express conceptual binaries and transition narratives between nature/culture, rural/urban, space/time, and past/future from which there cannot be any fixed solution to the question of non-statist urban subjectivity. This is demonstrated in regenerations of the exclusionary inside/outside logic of sovereignty identified in theories of urban citizenship. Following Jacques Derrida in his concept of ‘aporia’, I undergo a close examination of these two processes, arguing that their conditions of possibility contain the impossibility of their unification and necessarily invoke sovereign politics for securing their distinctions, while simultaneously rendering them inherently unstable. An analysis of the aporetic logic of sovereignty underlying two terms reveals that, rather than seeking closure to the question of urban citizenship, engaging with the aporia can open up political possibilities and challenges for future theoretical and empirical work for politics. / Graduate

O objeto principal deste projeto é a tradução integral do diálogo Lísis de Platão. A tradução foi feita a partir do Oxford Classical Text, Platonis Opera, III (Oxford, 1903), editado por John Burnet. Além da tradução, também faz parte deste trabalho um texto introdutório ao diálogo. Apesar de ser enquadrado como um dos diálogos aporéticos de definição por muitos estudiosos, o Lísis apresenta uma complexidade filosófica muito grande e uma estrutura que o distancia dos outros diálogos desse grupo (Cármides, Laques, Eutífron, Hípias Maior). A pergunta não aparece no texto, ainda que esteja subjacente ao diálogo; a postura de Sócrates frente aos seus interlocutores é bastante diversa, assim como os próprios interlocutores não apresentam um pretenso saber. Propomos, a partir dessa perspectiva, realizar uma interpretação positiva do diálogo que contemple dois níveis possíveis de leitura: uma no âmbito dramático e/ou dialógico, e a outra no âmbito lógico-argumentativo ainda que, em diversos momentos, essas duas leituras estejam entrelaçadas. A obra oferece uma valiosa lição sobre o fazer discursivo filosófico que podemos apreender nos dois níveis de leitura. Essa lição também está intimamente ligada às aporias que permeiam todo o diálogo. Dessa forma, apresentamos essas duas camadas de leitura relacionadas com a função positiva da aporia no desenvolvimento da atividade filosófica. / The main purpose of this dissertation is the integral translation of Plato\'s Lysis. The translation is based on Oxford Classical Text, Platonis Opera, III (Oxford, 1903), edited by John Burnet. Besides the translation, an introductory study on dialogue\'s issues is also part of this research. Despite being framed as one of the definitional aporetic dialogues by many scholars, the Lysis presents a highly philosophical complexity and structure that distinguish it from other dialogues of that group (Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, Hippias Major). The question \' \' does not appear throughout the text, although it underlies the dialogue; Socrates\' behavior towards his interlocutors is quite diverse, as well as the speakers themselves do not present an alleged knowledge on the issue of discussion. From this standpoint, we attempt to presnt a constructive interpretation of the dialogue that comprises a twofold reading: one concerning the dramatic or dialogic framework, and the other the logical-argumentative context even though these two levels are eventually intertwined. The work offers a valuable lesson about the philosophical discourse that we can apprehend within the intersection of these two levels of interpretation. Insofar as this lesson is also closely linked to the aporias that permeate the entire dialogue, we contend that this twofold reading is intrinsically related to the positive role of aporia in the development of philosophical activity.

O objeto principal deste projeto é a tradução integral do diálogo Lísis de Platão. A tradução foi feita a partir do Oxford Classical Text, Platonis Opera, III (Oxford, 1903), editado por John Burnet. Além da tradução, também faz parte deste trabalho um texto introdutório ao diálogo. Apesar de ser enquadrado como um dos diálogos aporéticos de definição por muitos estudiosos, o Lísis apresenta uma complexidade filosófica muito grande e uma estrutura que o distancia dos outros diálogos desse grupo (Cármides, Laques, Eutífron, Hípias Maior). A pergunta não aparece no texto, ainda que esteja subjacente ao diálogo; a postura de Sócrates frente aos seus interlocutores é bastante diversa, assim como os próprios interlocutores não apresentam um pretenso saber. Propomos, a partir dessa perspectiva, realizar uma interpretação positiva do diálogo que contemple dois níveis possíveis de leitura: uma no âmbito dramático e/ou dialógico, e a outra no âmbito lógico-argumentativo ainda que, em diversos momentos, essas duas leituras estejam entrelaçadas. A obra oferece uma valiosa lição sobre o fazer discursivo filosófico que podemos apreender nos dois níveis de leitura. Essa lição também está intimamente ligada às aporias que permeiam todo o diálogo. Dessa forma, apresentamos essas duas camadas de leitura relacionadas com a função positiva da aporia no desenvolvimento da atividade filosófica. / The main purpose of this dissertation is the integral translation of Plato\'s Lysis. The translation is based on Oxford Classical Text, Platonis Opera, III (Oxford, 1903), edited by John Burnet. Besides the translation, an introductory study on dialogue\'s issues is also part of this research. Despite being framed as one of the definitional aporetic dialogues by many scholars, the Lysis presents a highly philosophical complexity and structure that distinguish it from other dialogues of that group (Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, Hippias Major). The question \' \' does not appear throughout the text, although it underlies the dialogue; Socrates\' behavior towards his interlocutors is quite diverse, as well as the speakers themselves do not present an alleged knowledge on the issue of discussion. From this standpoint, we attempt to presnt a constructive interpretation of the dialogue that comprises a twofold reading: one concerning the dramatic or dialogic framework, and the other the logical-argumentative context even though these two levels are eventually intertwined. The work offers a valuable lesson about the philosophical discourse that we can apprehend within the intersection of these two levels of interpretation. Insofar as this lesson is also closely linked to the aporias that permeate the entire dialogue, we contend that this twofold reading is intrinsically related to the positive role of aporia in the development of philosophical activity.

archives@tulane.edu / The Platonic Socrates is renowned both for his disavowals of knowledge and for his irony, and it is often the case that both interlocutors and readers believe his disavowals to be ironic. Such a belief frequently underlies interpretations of Plato’s Meno, which take Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is to be either partially or entirely untrue; either Socrates knows what virtue is or he at least knows in some respect even if he does not know its essential being, its ousia. This dissertation argues that Socrates is being honest in his claim in the Meno not to know at all what virtue is, and this means he is not able to recognize some one thing called “virtue.” This serves as a starting point for a new interpretation that examines the arguments and the drama of the dialogue as an illumination of Socrates’ perplexing disavowal of knowledge. Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is shown to indicate an aporia he confronts with respect to his understanding of virtue. And this aporia, it is argued, concerns, not what virtue is but that it is. The dissertation argues further that Socrates’ aporia with respect to virtue is fundamentally woven into his uncertainty about whether knowledge is possible at all. The fundamental character of Socratic philosophy, which is practiced by investigating with others into the virtues, is thus shown to involve an investigation into the very foundation of philosophy itself. / 1 / Alexander James Shaeffer

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2007. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 291-301).

Yes

The aim of this thesis was to investigate trope usage in videogames, including the emergence of undiscovered ‘videogame’ tropes, and to create a new model for videogame categorisation using these tropes. This model serves to complement genre as a means of distilling videogame contents. The investigative work formed two parts, initially considering how videogames use existing rhetorical tropes such as metaphor as expressive and communicative devices and secondly to analyse videogames as a source of shared literary tropes. Each shared literary trope was validated as a common form of expression (referred to simply as 'common form'), where its presence was proven in a substantial sample of videogames. Common forms were gathered through a wide-ranging investigation of ten mainstream genres one at a time and in isolation to arrive at a pool of genre-specific common forms. The most closely related forms combined, with the help of relationship modelling techniques. A set of common forms capable of representing the contents of any videogame was reached. The result is a powerful hierarchical content model allowing a game to be described in terms of its common form usage profile. Common forms can effectively describe games which span several genres and differentiates between games which appear similar on the surface e.g. within the same genre hence aiding effective classification. Common Forms were proven to exist on a number of different hierarchies ranging from those specific to a particular game, to a game type (genre) and even to those which are universal and hence can be observed within any modern videogame. Finally, it was possible to see the very core or 'heart' of the functioning videogame, the never-ending competition between player resources such as energy, ammunition or shields, the 'player status' and the threats, challenges or obstacles the game's systems throw at the player, the 'game status'. The model does have considerable potential for application in educational settings such as college and university game development or appraisal classes and further development and testing would provide an effective tool for industry use.

Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy / If Plato’s dialogues offer recollection as a paradigm for human knowing, then, forgetfulness as the opposite of recollection, would seem to be ignorance, or the destruction of knowing. However, forgetfulness is not simply recollection’s opposite, but it also serves as its precondition; to recollect something, one must first forget it. Forgetfulness involves an absence that may re-present itself. This dual nature of forgetfulness as, on the one hand, a precondition for philosophical recollection and, on the other, characteristic of ignorance and destruction of knowledge, mirrors the experience of perplexity (ἀπορία), which can serve either as the impetus for philosophical inquiry or as the ground to foreclose any further questioning. My dissertation considers the implications of forgetting, foresight, and oversight, in Plato's Protagoras as a new way to shed light on the relationship and difference between the sophist and philosopher. I propose that both philosophy and Protagorean sophistry understand something about the nature and limits of human understanding in light of our tendency to forget. Protagorean sophistry, however, attempts to overcome human limits in its aim at perfect foresight. Protagoras ultimately capitulates to ἀπορία by refusing to inquire earnestly, thereby avoiding the problem posed by our tendency to forget. Socratic philosophy, on the other hand, cultivates and maintains ἀπορία in its recognition that forgetting is a limitation that is at once intrinsic to human understanding and the necessary occasion for learning that underlies all philosophical inquiry. Socratic foresight, in opposition to Protagorean foresight, is characterized by its recognition that ἀπορία and oversight are persistent and unavoidable conditions of all human inquiry. Rather than attempt to overcome human nature either by capitulating to or resolving ἀπορία in a definitive answer, Socratic philosophy is depicted as an aporetic way of living, which thus remains open to what is yet to be known. In this way, Socratic foresight comes to light as superior to that of Protagorean sophistry both in its self-knowledge and in its implicit affirmation of what would otherwise seem to be a mere weakness in human nature. Socratic foresight welcomes ἀπορία as the condition for all human inquiry and achievement. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.