土地制度規範著對於土地的使用所引起的人與人之間相互認可的行為關係，對於制度起源的討論，往往認為制度具有降低成本、創造集體利益的功能，但由於制度主體的因素，制度則可能是國家對某一群體的剝削，例如日治時期將原住民土地收歸國有；由於制度安排的失當，很可能使得後續的發展陷入惡性的路徑依賴之中，例如民國五十五年的保留地私有化政策後原住民地權的快速流失。
一項近年的政府調查顯示，原住民保留地被非法使用、私下轉讓的情況日益嚴重，但同一時期的另一項研究卻又指出：原住民社會普遍傾向認為原住民保留地不得移轉給非原住民的限制不宜開放。從政治經濟的角度來說，保留地若朝向全面的私有化、開放原漢買賣，固然可以回應市場立即的需求，但交易過程中信息不完全、原住民經濟的弱勢等等外部效果卻不可能依靠市場機制加以解決，同時，可預見的原住民土地大量流失將和社會普遍認同的價值相違背；另一方面，保留地若朝向以國有化進行政府的干預，固然可以抑制自由買賣造成的原住民地權流失，但卻又和資源利用極佳化的市場邏輯相去甚遠而必須付出高額的成本，亦難以有效執行；從制度研究的眼光來看，現行的保留地制度正處於兩難下的制度失衡狀態。
在五年的反覆討論之後，內政部法規會於九十年一月十七號通過了「原住民族保留地開發管理條例草案」，該條例草案最大的特色是在所有權移轉限制下，增加了「原住民族保留區」的制度設計，在「原住民族保留區」中的土地所有權，得登記為原住民部落團體「共有」，土地的經營管理也將由部落團體來共同進行，這樣的政策所呈現是政府對於社會壓力和原住民土地困境的回應。然而，作為共有制實行的基礎，無論是在學理上或實證上，對於共有資源自主治理的探討都有尚待進一步充實的空間。
經過先期的調查和訪談，本研究選定新竹縣尖石鄉中三個公共資源自主治理的案例，並從制度經濟與集體選擇理論的架構，分析案例中人們如何建立自主性的組織，如何經由集體的選擇制定符合當地條件的公共資源治理規則，如何履行彼此的承諾並相互監督，以及如何避免陷入集體不理性的過度利用的悲劇，且對於案例中影響原住民部落採取資源共有和自主治理策略的因素加以探討。最後，評析內在制度的變遷及泰雅族傳統制度在現代的演化，以及公共資源自主管理在降低執行和監督成本、降低其外部效果、降低制度供給的成本等方面的制度優勢，並指出資源形式與共有範圍的關係、學習過程的重要、共有組織的作用是為共有制度有效運作的關鍵。
此外，在後續研究部份，本研究亦建議：理論上對於非以直接提取資源單位方式產生的利益分配問題、排他性技術的成本的雙重影響的探討；實證上對於集團移住後的原住民部落中共有組織的分析；政策上對共有組織「分級分類」原則的研議，皆值得作為後續進一步研究的課題。 / Institution about land rules the relationship, which is caused by land using and identified between people. According to the discussion of the beginning of institution, it can descend the cost of trade and make collective interesting. However, institutions can also be the means for a nation to exploit its people because of the subject of institution. The Nationalization of land, which is owned by aboriginal people in the time Japan governed Taiwan for instance. And, because of the improper arrangement of institution, the development may go in to a vicious path-dependence circle; the privatization policy in 1966 made the fast lapse of aboriginal land for example.
A recent investigation made by government shows that more and more aboriginal reserved-land was illegally sold and transferred in the black market. However, in the same time, another research appointed that most people in aboriginal society disagree the revocation of the limit that non-aboriginal cannot get the property of aboriginal reserved-land. In the view of political economics, if the property of aboriginal reserved-land was turn to entirely privatized, it can reply the immediate need market, but the external diseconomy such as incomplete information and the lower position of the aboriginal people can not be resolved by the market, and the following results that most of the aboriginal land property lapse will belie the general value identified by our society. On the other hand, if the property of aboriginal keeps on nationalized it can bate the lapse of the land property, but government has to pay high cost to belie the market logic hat resource should be optima used, and it will be difficult to administer. In the view of institutional study, the institution of aboriginal reserved-land is in a situation of inequilibrium.
After a long discussion lasted from more than five years, the Act Committee of Administer Department announced a proposed act for the development and administers of aboriginal reserved-land. The most particular part of this proposed act is the design of "aboriginal-reserved zone" and common land property. The total area of the aboriginal reserved zones was supposed to be 1.4 million acres, and the land property in the zones may belong to the whole settlement society. Such a policy is a positive reply to the social strait and the predicament of aboriginal society. However, being the base to exercise the common property institution, either the theoretical or the practical discussion of the "common pool resources self-governing" still needs to be completed.
A previous investigation and visiting, an Atayal county with three CPR self-governing cases was chosen in this approach. With a framework of institutional economics and collective act theory, this approach analyzed how people organized a self-governing organization, how a public choice was made to design the rules which are proper to local CPR situation, how people fulfill their obligation and supervise each other, how people avoid the tragic result o collective irrationality such as over using, furthermore, discuss the factor effect the CPR self-governing strategy .In the end, this approach discuss the change of internal institution and the evolution of Atayal tribes’ traditional institution in modern time, and the advantage of self-governing institution. Then, pointed out the relation between types of resources and areas of common property, the processes of learning, and the effects of organization are the key points to exercise the common property institution.
In addition, this approach suggested: in the theoretical aspect, the dispute caused by distribution of the interest that was not made by direct appropriation, the dual influence from the cost of exclusion technology. And, in the practical aspect, the principles to classify the self-governing organizations, can be the new problematic for further approach.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/A2010000209 |
| Creators | 官大偉 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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