The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1
1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5
1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9
1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11
1.4. Outlook .................................. 16
I. Cognitivism 21
2. Introduction 21
3. Cognitivism: the basics 22
3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22
3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28
3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31
4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35
5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38
5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40
5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44
5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55
6. Conclusion 63
II. Noncognitivism 67
7. Introduction 67
8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69
8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69
8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71
8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79
8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85
9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88
10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90
10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96
10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99
10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103
11. Conclusion 112
III. Practical Cognitivism 115
12. Introduction 115
12.1. Diagnosis .................................115
12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125
13. The generic concept of form 130
13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136
14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138
15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145
15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146
15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148
16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153
17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160
17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161
17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1
7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167
18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172
19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179
19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180
19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191
20.Conclusion 196
21.Objections 198
21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
21.2. The formalism objection .........................208
22. Acknowledgement 219
References 220
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:75218 |
| Date | 25 June 2021 |
| Creators | Zahn, Jonas |
| Contributors | Universität Leipzig |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion, doc-type:doctoralThesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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