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O agir moral na fundamenta??o da metaf?sica dos costumes e na cr?tica da raz?o pr?tica

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Previous issue date: 2017-05-18 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo deste trabalho ser? investigar como Kant explica ou fundamenta o agir moral
na Fundamenta??o da Metaf?sica dos Costumes e na Cr?tica da Raz?o Pr?tica. Com efeito,
podemos dizer que o agir moral na primeira est? fundamentado na espontaneidade do agir dada
pela liberdade. Na KpV podemos dizer que o agir moral ? fundamentado na lei moral como um
factum da raz?o. Portanto, para mostrar esses dois pontos, o seguinte caminho ser? seguido: em
2.1 ser? mostrado o surgimento de uma nova concep??o de moralidade. Em 2.2 veremos que a
nova concep??o interpreta a moralidade como autonomia. No ponto 3 examinaremos elementos
que caracterizam a natureza do agir moral na GMS e na filosofia moral Kantiana. No ponto 3.1
veremos que Kant sustenta o agir moral na terceira se??o da GMS na ideia de que, quando nos
pensamos enquanto livres, somos transportados a um mundo intelig?vel, poss?vel pela liberdade.
Tamb?m falaremos, nessa mesma subse??o, sobre os problemas relacionados ao c?rculo
vicioso, ? dedu??o da lei moral na GMS bem como ? distin??o entre um mundo sens?vel e
intelig?vel. No ponto 4 sobre o factum da raz?o mostraremos o factum como sendo a consci?ncia
da lei moral e como n?o sendo pass?vel de dedu??o. Mostraremos que Kant sustenta o agir
moral na KpV em tal factum. Ainda introduziremos nesse mesmo t?pico, as duas interpreta??es
poss?veis do factum da raz?o. Na subse??o seguinte, em 4.1 ser? mostrada a interpreta??o de
Beck (1960) segundo a qual temos na KpV o que poderia corresponder formalmente a uma
dedu??o do princ?pio moral. Em 4.2 analisaremos a interpreta??o de Allison (1990) segundo o
qual o factum da raz?o pode ser compreendido como factum da raz?o, ou seja, como evid?ncia
de que a raz?o pura ? pr?tica. Em 4.3 veremos que, ao contr?rio de Beck, Almeida (1998) ir?
negar que seja poss?vel uma dedu??o da lei moral na KpV. Com efeito, Almeida (1998) ir?
verificar que em raz?o dessa impossibilidade o sentido de factum da raz?o que se imporia seria
o sentido cognitivista (ou intuicionista). Nessa mesma subse??o, tendo em vista a interpreta??o
cognitivista exporemos a interpreta??o da Beck (1981) em que o mesmo rejeita o ponto de vista
cognitivista. Na subse??o 4.4 veremos, basicamente, a liberdade enquanto condi??o do agir
moral na KpV. E, por fim, concentraremos a nossa aten??o no sentimento moral na KpV. / The aim of this work will be to investigate how Kant explains or grounds moral action
in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Indeed, we
can say that the moral action in the first is grounded on spontaneity of action give by freedom.
Therefore, to show these points, the following path will be followed: in 2.1 we will see the
emergence of a new conception of morality. In 2.2 we will see that the new conception interprets
the morality as autonomy. In section 3 we will examine elements that characterize the nature of
moral action in the GMS and in the Kantian moral philosophy. In point 3.1 we will see that Kant
sustains moral action in the third section of the GMS in the idea that when we think ourselves
as free we are transposed into an intelligible world, possible for freedom. We will also speak in
this same subsection of the problems related to the vicious circle, the deduction of the moral
law in the GMS as well as the distinction between a sensible and intelligible world. In point 4
on the factum of reason we will show the factum as being the consciousness of the moral law
and as not being able to deduction. We will show that Kant sustains the moral action in the KpV
on the ideia of such factum. We will also introduce in this same topic the two possible interpretations
of the factum of reason. In the next subsection in 4.1 we will show Beck?s (1960) interpretation
according to which we have in KpV what could formally correspond to a deduction of
the moral principle. In 4.2 we will see Allison?s (1990) interpretation according to which such
factum of reason can be understood as factum of reason, that is, as evidence that pure reason is
practical. In 4.3 we will show that, unlike Beck (1960), Almeida (1998) will deny that a deduction
of the moral law in the KpV is possible. In fact, Almeida (1998), will conclude because of
this impossibility, the sense of factum of reason that would be imposed would be the cognitivist
(or intuitionist) sense. In this same subsection, in view of the cognitivist interpretation we will
expose Beck?s (1981) interpretation in which he rejects the cognitivist point of view. In subsection
4.4 we will see freedom as a condition of moral in the KpV and, finally, we will focus
our attention on the moral feeling in the KpV.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:repositorio.ufrn.br:123456789/23563
Date18 May 2017
CreatorsSilva, Hort?nsia Teresa Tomaz da
Contributors00393365069, http://lattes.cnpq.br/6509960442502778, Nahra, Cinara Maria Leite, 40030270006, http://lattes.cnpq.br/3185309694904313, Santos, Leonel Ribeiro dos, 23314024851, http://lattes.cnpq.br/7707912410094645, Borges, Maria de Lourdes Alves, 43574688091, http://lattes.cnpq.br/7482438465356926, Klein, Joel Thiago
PublisherPROGRAMA DE P?S-GRADUA??O EM FILOSOFIA, UFRN, Brasil
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguagePortuguese
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Sourcereponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRN, instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, instacron:UFRN
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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