In 1971 the right of re-trial in the Supreme Court was reformed and led to the court becoming a distinct forum for setting precedents. As a consequence of this the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court was greatly reduced as the court’s primary task would be only to try cases and other issues of importance for the guidance of the application of the law. Before the reform in question, the focus of reviewing cases in the Supreme Court had been to ensure materially correct rulings. However, the legislator’s ambition was, through the reform, to allow the later function to disappear and instead concentrate the judicial activity to the legal system’s need for guidance, to reduce the flow of appealed cases and thereby the court’s workload. As a court of precedent, the Supreme Court’s rulings have a great authoritative effect, not only for the practice in the lower courts, but also for others who operate in the practical legal life such as government agencies, industry- and interest organizations, lawyers and, in the long run, general citizens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s way of writing its judgments has changed over time, especially since the 1971 reform. Today the reasons in the decisions, both in criminal and civil cases, show a considerable scope of legal argumentation from several angles in a completely different way compared to the quite laconic rulings from older times. Because of this, a common element in the Supreme Court’s verdicts nowdays is the use of obiter dicta (in singularis: obiter dictum). Ratio decidendi means the reasons that determined the outcome of the case. In other words, the parts of the court’s reasoning that is necessary for the verdict. Obiter dictum is the opposite, i.e. something that is stated in the reasons but not necessary for the court to be able to decide on the disputed matter. For instance, obiter dicta can be made through general statements containing detailed descriptions of the legal situation, solid investigations regarding related issues but not relevant for the case or drawn conclusions linked to things or circumstances not invoked by the parties and therefore outside the frame of the trial. In this context severel interesting questions arise connected to obiter dicum as a legal phenomenon and whether it is appropriate. Some prominent doctrinal authors and former judges of the Supreme Court believe that the same court lacks the mandate to present answers to unclear legal issues and precedential matters outside the framework of the trial and through obiter dicta - statements. A few have even argued that it is unconstitutional. The aim of this master thesis is to examine whether the use of obiter dicta corresponds with the Supreme Court’s main function based on the rules of procedure and other relevant legislation for the court in its precedent setting activity.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-223523 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | Björnberg, Jacob |
| Publisher | Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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