This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc6058 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Sager, John |
| Contributors | Lewis, Adrian R., Chet, Guy, Wawro, Geoffrey, Tanner, Harold |
| Publisher | University of North Texas |
| Source Sets | University of North Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | Text |
| Rights | Public, Copyright, Sager, John, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved. |
Page generated in 0.0023 seconds