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For more than a half century Douglas MacArthur was a servant of the United States. He is best remembered as a general and a soldier, especially for his leadership during World War II and the Korean War. MacArthur was also the Superintendent of West Point, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Generalissimo ( Commander) of the Armed Forces and Military Advisor (Minister of Defense) to the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and the Supreme Commander Allied Powers and the Military Governor of occupied Japan. In these positions he functioned not as a soldier, but as a senior public administrator. The dissertation will begin by establishing the military as a valid and unique field of Public Administration. Contributions of military adminstration to the discipline of Public Administration will then be examined. The dissertation will examine MacArthur's professional and academic training for his previously listed administrative posts. A determination and analysis of MacArthur's theoretical and applied approaches to Public Administration and General Management Theories will be made. The analysis of MacArthur's performance in his administrative positions will be made against a backdrop of contemporary Public Administration Theory. / Ph. D.

Was Douglas MacArthur directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military during the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942? This question is still a point of debate among historians. During the six years that preceded the United States entrance into the Second World War, the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines attempted to implement a national defense plan devised by Douglas MacArthur. The end goal of MacArthur's plan was the creation of a professional Filipino military force that would be able to adequately defend the Philippines against invasion. From late 1935 until mid 1941 , MacArthur served as the official United States military adviser to the Commonwealth government. When war with Japan occurred in late 1941 the Philippine military was in dismal shape. The argument that MacArthur was directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military in the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 is strongly supported by historical evidence of events that occurred during the creation, development, and fielding of the Philippine military in 1934-1941. An investigation of historical evidence shows that MacArthur is responsible for making a series of errors that caused rampant financial problems and an inadequate training program. These factors directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of Philippine military units during the 1941-1942 campaign.

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This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.