Call number: LD2668 .T4 1961 M36

The study begins with an overview of the 1948 political situation, followed by the evaluation of Truman's use of ethical appeal using criteria developed by Thonssen, Baird, and Braden. Each of their three constituents of ethical appeal--character, sagacity, and good will--is applied to four speeches. Results of the analysis establish that Truman utilized a strong ethical appeal during the campaign. Conclusions are that his use of ethical appeal probably had a significant effect on the voters of America. Regardless of the quality of his use of pathos or logos, a less capable use of ethical appeal would probably have had a fatal effect on his campaign.

In the last two decades of his life, Harry S. Truman formally established the office of the ex-presidency in the public eye. The goals he wanted to accomplish and the legislation passed to help Truman achieve these aims led the way for Truman and other former presidents to play a significant role in American public life. Men who had occupied the nation's highest office had a great deal to offer their country, and Truman saw to it that he and other former presidents had the financial and the institutional support to continue serving their nation in productive ways. Although out of the White House, Harry S. Truman wanted to continue to play an active role in the affairs of the nation and the Democratic party. In pursuing this goal, he found that he was limited by a lack of financial support and was forced to turn to the federal government for assistance. While Truman was active for more than a decade after he left Washington, his two most important legacies were helping push for federal legislation to provide financial support for ex-presidents and to organize and maintain presidential libraries. Truman believed that these endeavors were a small price for the nation to pay to support thee former occupants of the nation's highest office. Furthermore, Truman believed that presidential libraries were essential in preserving and disseminating the history of the nation's highest office. Truman's other activities including heavy involvement in partisan affairs. While he tried unsuccessfully to determine the party's presidential candidates, his involvement in the Democratic party and attendance at partisan events displayed his level of commitment to the party and his determination to play a role in its activities.

On May 9, 1950, President Truman declared that “all our international policies, taken together, form a program designed to strengthen and unite the free world.” My dissertation is the first history of the “free world,” a crucial concept that identified the object of U.S. leadership, drove the country to seek global preeminence, and shaped the American understanding of the Cold War. For much of the nineteenth century, American policymakers had envisioned a globe divided into a “new world” of freedom and an “old world” of tyranny. In 1917, Woodrow Wilson proposed a new global dichotomy, arguing for the creation of a trans-Atlantic coalition of democracies against aggressive autocracies whose very existence threatened the survival of freedom everywhere. A revised version of this logic prevailed during the Second World War. But it was only after the start of the Cold War in the late 1940s that American policymakers embraced the concept of an enduring and extra-hemispheric “free world.” Their efforts to lead, unite and strengthen this spatially defined “free world” prompted a massive expansion of American foreign policy and fundamentally transformed the country’s position in the international arena.

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces in Korea. Since the dismissal, contemporaries of the Truman-MacArthur era and historians have tried to make sense of Truman's momentous decision to relieve one of America's greatest military heroes. While a great number of studies have devoted attention to the controversy, few if any have placed the Truman-MacArthur conflict within the context of the unprecedented militarization of American foreign policy that took place during the early cold war. This study departs from the traditional "blame-casting" that has dominated Truman-MacArthur scholarship in the past and concludes that General MacArthur was a casualty who was dismissed because he failed to grasp the global nature of the post-World War II American foreign policy agenda.Chapter One analyzes the literature dealing with the Truman-Macarthur controversy and illustrates why historical scholarship has failed to grasp the larger forces at work in American foreign policy while MacArthur was UN Commander in Korea. Chapter Two traces the tumultuous events of the controversy from the outbreak of war in Korea to MacArthur's April 11 dismissal. Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Senate hearings that followed MacArthur's dismissal, illustrates the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony, and explores the broader, global issues the Truman Administration faced in transforming its foreign policy while General MacArthur failed to grasp the nature of this transformation. / Department of History

The dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur on April 11, 1951, from all of his commands by President Truman furnished the impetus for this survey of editorial opinion and reaction. The newspaper editorial opinion represents five major daily newspapers with broad geographic coverage of the State of Indiana, plus a wide range of political reaction to the topic. The editorial opinion is also representative ofea diverse socio-economic base.Of the five newspapers, the Evansville Courier was one of two that retained a consistently rational outlook toward the American scene during the Truman-MacArthur conflict. It took the position early that the Korean War should not be expanded, that the chance of an expanding war with China was to be avoided. The Courier expressed its dissatisfaction with the Truman foreign policy record, including the loss of China. It supported executive privilege and roundly attacked MacArthur.The Fort Wayne News Sentinel was very conservative, expertly vindictive, and at times somewhat irrational in its editorial opinion. At other times, its tenor was completely opposite. After fighting had been stabilized at the 38th parallel, it advised moving no further north,thus supporting limitation of the war. The News Sentinel supported MacArthur to the hilt and generally, deplored American negotiations and her "cringing" under Russian communism.The Gary Post Tribune's record in regard to the Truman Administration was that it had failed in its Far Eastern foreign policy and that the policy was unclear. It called MacArthur's dismissal unfortunate, but added that the move was supported in the interest of preserving civilian supremacy and the western alliances. Early in the Senate hearings, it applauded the conduct of those proceedings but as they ground on, pleaded for their end. Imploring its readers to rational thinking, the Post Tribune insisted "Cold Reason Must Rule" and deplored the fact that it felt that negotiation was becoming synonymous with appeasement.The Indianapolis Star's production of editorial opinion was prolific, in comparison to the other newspapers. The Star maintained a consistent conservative Republican approach to all issues. The Truman Administration was condemned for loss of the World War II "Pacific victory," for appeasement and defeatism, and for the formulation and execution of its Far Eastern foreign policy. Russia was seen as the real enemy of America, and early in the Korean War, military limitations were supported but later those same limitations were attacked vigorously. The concept of limiting the war was said to encourage further aggression. The Star advocated the protection of executive privilege, and as the Senate hearings progressed, informed its readers that no new information could be gained from the testimony.Of the five newspapers, the Palladium Item was the most reactionary and irrational. Although, at times, emotionalism and an occasional case of irrationality overcame the News Sentinel and Star, the Palladium Item made a steady diet of those "entrees." In describing the toll of American lives in the Korean War, the paper revealed its nature in the editorial, the "Truman Meat Grinder." Allies were seen as worthless and Truman as a "puppet" of England. The paper insisted that Truman's "hatchet-men" were trying to smear the General's character, because he was a "champion" against "traitorous" elements in America.The editorial reaction of the five papers was conservative and condemned the Truman Administration foreign policy, especially in the Far East. The Evansville Courier and the Gary Post Tribune presented well thought-out opinions based on a rational approach to the frustrations of Americans in the Korean War and adherence to the concept of limited war. The Republican newspapers, the Indianapolis Star, the Fort Wayne News Sentinel, and the Richmond Palladium Item, adhered to the Republican condemnation of the Truman Administration.

The idea that the United States is bequeathed the special mission of leading mankind toward liberty has dominated U.S. foreign relations since the American Revolution. It remains the most pervasive theme in Americans' thought about the world to the extent that over time, it has become firmly embedded in the nation's historical and cultural consciousness. A study of diplomatic, intellectual, and cultural history, America in the World: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1944-1950 examines the impact of this exceptionalist vision on the policies and public debates that influenced Americans' thinking about their role in the world from the beginning of their efforts to design the global post-World War II order to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Believers in Lockean progress and advocates of modernization, the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman sought to establish a one-world order based on American liberal political and economic ideals. At the heart of this American-designed postwar world stood the United Nations, created to ensure collective security and foster a spirit of international collaboration, and transnational institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, envisioned to protect the global economy and promote free trade. These institutions served as concrete articulations of U.S. national interests yet at the same time they were intended to inaugurate a "New Deal" and a "Fair Deal" for the world. Interpreting American post-war and Cold War policymaking through the lens of exceptionalism provides a complementary methodological framework to the national security or economic theses more commonly employed to describe this period. When the Soviet Union refused to accept the American-designed one-world order, the American response - inside and outside of government - was overwhelmingly shaped by ideology. While economic considerations and national security influenced U.S. Cold War policy, this dissertation demonstrates that it was the challenge posed by Moscow's universalist aspirations and Communism's inherent teleological ideology that caused Americans to turn the Cold War into a battle for a way of life.

This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.