Abstract
dc:description.abstractComputers are constantly being enhanced to improve their speed, size, security, and energy consumption. Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) improves energy efficiency by enabling a processor to upscale its power as needed, thus using little energy when idle. And, more recently, hardware-based trusted execution environments such as Software Guard Extensions (SGX) have been created with the promise of securely executing sensitive processes—thus protecting the data and running computations from a root adversary. In the first part of this thesis, we show how the attempt to make computers more efficient by dynamically responding to their energy needs has created a new attack surface. Specifically, we are able to retrieve keys from both an AES and a RSA cryptographic process running inside an SGX enclave by lowering the operating voltage. We further investigate the undervolting effect and are able to improve the attack to create an out-of-bounds under/overflow. Meanwhile, fault injection attacks (such as our software undervolting one) represent a major threat to Internet-of-Things and embedded devices. As of today, evaluating to what extent a device is susceptible to fault injection is a mostly manual process, requiring significant expert knowledge and often expensive, complex lab equipment. In addition, even if a fault can be induced, it is often unclear which effect caused the incorrect output. In the second part of this thesis, we address this difficulty by designing and building a performant, exhaustive fault injection tool. We compare our software with three others and demonstrate it out-performs on features and speed.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- d_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- d_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Murdock, Kit
Subjects
dc:subject × 3Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng