Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this thesis, I challenge Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, and his claim that his own work is a corrected version of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I argue that Schopenhauer misconstrues Kant in several significant ways, and that, by considering why this is the case, an alternative interpretation can be found, allowing a more defensible version of Kant’s conception of moral agency to emerge. I begin by contrasting how each philosopher develops his view of the basis of ethics from what they take to be ordinary human experience, outlining the difference in their approaches to the roles of rationality and the will. Some specific Schopenhauerian criticisms are then examined, in order to demonstrate that, by defending Kant, a way can be found to interpret him, avoiding the difficulties. My construal of Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’ then suggests such a way and reinforces my contention that Schopenhauer does not correct Kant. I then propose a version of moral agency which emanates from Kant’s architechtonic, highlighting the difference between the purposiveness necessary to Kant’s scheme and the purposelessness of Schopenhauer’s, thus concluding my argument that this irreconcilable difference derives from the more fundamental incompatibility of their different conceptions of rationality.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- m_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- m_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 1998
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wright, Elizabeth Milligan
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng