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University of Birmingham

Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
d_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
d_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sen Gupta, Sonali

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Sen Gupta, Sonali. Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games. d_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014.