Boston University
Board meetings and the information gap between managers and independent directors
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. Lastly, using a subsample of firms that voluntarily disclose disaggregated information on board meetings, I find that the form of board meetings also matters: in-person board meetings reduce the manager-director information gap, while remote board meetings do not. Overall, board meetings’ informational efficacy depends on mandatory board independence, independent directors’ characteristics, and board meetings’ organizational forms.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Management
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2021
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Jiang, Yijing
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Brochet, Francois
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43115