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Boston University

Examining cognitive expertise as a type of expertise and a requirement for moral expertise

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Cognitive expertise is generally described as expertise that comes from propositional knowledge. It stands in contrast to performative expertise, which consists of skillfully doing actions in a particular domain D; analytic expertise, which involves identifying the domain-specific norms that guide a judgment in D; and communicative expertise, which comes from regularly communicating about D. The first two chapters of this dissertation offer solutions to two unresolved issues in the cognitive expertise literature: the correct definition of cognitive expertise and the novice/two expert problem. In Chapter 1, I argue that cognitive expertise in some domain D is defined as having at time t: (1) more evidence about propositions in D than most people; (2) a superior ability to reason based on that evidence; and (3) reliable beliefs and judgments about D because of that evidence and ability. The novice/two expert problem occurs when a cognitive novice must choose between two putative cognitive experts’ opposing judgments but can’t make a justified choice because of her novice status. Alvin Goldman offers five sources of evidence that a cognitive novice can rely on to solve her problem. Since Goldman’s sources will often be difficult for a cognitive novice to access, understand, and/or assess, I offer a new, generally applicable solution to the problem: a lesser cognitive expert, i.e., someone who has more cognitive expertise in the relevant domain than a cognitive novice but less than people who have complete cognitive expertise in it. I argue a cognitive novice can make a justified choice by relying on a lesser cognitive expert whom she knows personally and who is her general epistemic peer. The final two chapters concern expertise in a particular domain: morality. In Chapter 3, I argue that cognitive expertise is the only type of expertise required for moral expertise. In Chapter 4, I take the position that while complete moral expertise is currently impossible, lesser moral expertise is possible. I argue that to understand moral expertise, we need to focus on non-philosophers as lesser moral experts. To that end, I offer methods for identifying lesser moral experts and subdomains of moral expertise.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Medeiros, Mallory
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Star, Daniel

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Medeiros, Mallory. Examining cognitive expertise as a type of expertise and a requirement for moral expertise. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665