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Boston University

Three essays on fiscal policy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. The first chapter studies tax competition through a tractable general equilibrium framework that highlights the key mechanisms driving states’ tax-setting behavior. The model provides a theoretical explanation for why states with deeper labor markets set higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium and predicts that tax competition intensifies as firm mobility increases. I test these predictions using a novel dataset constructed from sector-specific tax cuts implemented at the state level in Brazil and find support for the proposed model. In the second chapter, I quantify the cost of eliminating tax competition in Brazil by imposing a uniform tax rate nationwide. I develop a quantitatively robust spatial general equilibrium model that combines a canonical international trade structure with a game-theoretic framework in which states choose their tax policies while taking other states’ policies as given, to maximize an objective function. Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Boston University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Marx, Benjamin
  • Lagakos, David
ORCID dc:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Boston University
Base URL
open.bu.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio. Three essays on fiscal policy. doctoral thesis, Boston University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773