Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. The first chapter studies tax competition through a tractable general equilibrium framework that highlights the key mechanisms driving states’ tax-setting behavior. The model provides a theoretical explanation for why states with deeper labor markets set higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium and predicts that tax competition intensifies as firm mobility increases. I test these predictions using a novel dataset constructed from sector-specific tax cuts implemented at the state level in Brazil and find support for the proposed model. In the second chapter, I quantify the cost of eliminating tax competition in Brazil by imposing a uniform tax rate nationwide. I develop a quantitatively robust spatial general equilibrium model that combines a canonical international trade structure with a game-theoretic framework in which states choose their tax policies while taking other states’ policies as given, to maximize an objective function. Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Boston University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Marx, Benjamin
- Lagakos, David
- ORCID dc:identifier.orcid
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773