Abstract
dc:description.abstractHusserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege's influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Campus Only
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Morgan, Matthew Radford
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Lanei Rodemeyer
- Eleanore Holveck
- Fred Evans
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1575