Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe thesis reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection and presents three original research chapters. The first chapter puts the thesis into perspective with respect to the ongoing discussion of labor market reform in Europe. It presents the main theoretical insights and the empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection. Finally, it gives an introduction to the topics that are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter two considers the relationship between adjustment costs in the labor market and the functional distribution of income. Adjustment costs cause movements of the labor share, if the economy experiences shocks to business conditions or wage levels. With linear adjustment costs and Cobb- Douglas technology, these movements are independent of the size of these shocks, but depend on the size of the adjustment costs only. An empirical analysis complements the investigation and finds evidence that adjustment costs are important for factor share movements. Chapter three adresses the effects of employment protection on firms' competitiveness, if these interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. A firm facing employment protection and workers already hired will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. Using a dynamic model it is shown for the benchmark case of contest competition that the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Chapter four considers a quite general private provision problem. If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2003
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Kessing, Sebastian Georg
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad
- Prof. Giuseppe Bertola, Ph.D.
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
dc:rights.accessrights- Statement dc:rights.accessrights
-
- open access
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- URN
- urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-2003002028
- Identifier URI
- http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-5865
- Dc Identifier Other
-
FUDISS_thesis_000000001056
FUDISS_derivate_000000001056