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McMaster University

Nietzsche's Rejection of Transcendent Truth

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>In this thesis I address Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. I begin with an examination of the claims in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, where the transcendent truth is rejected on the grounds that it is self-contradictory impossibility. However, if this is the case, then how is it possible for Nietzsche to make such a claim? Docs he not implicitly exclude his own account from this critique? To investigate this matter, I offer an interpretation of his critique of the history of Western morality since the time of Socrates and how it relates to what he terms the human, all-too-human origins of the concept of truth. This leads to a discussion of his claims concerning the essentially perspectival and interpretive nature of human knowing. I argue that this view of knowledge. in which truth and life are viewed as one and the same, saves Nietzsche from the charge of internal inconsistency.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2002

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Blackwood, Stephen
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ajzenstat, S.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/8599
9673
4893467

Chain of custody

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McMaster University
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Last updated
2026-11-18
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citation

Blackwood, Stephen. Nietzsche's Rejection of Transcendent Truth. 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770