Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis's modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.</p> <p>I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis's view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Year dc:date.issued
- 1996
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Sullivan, Andrew
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Vorobej, M.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier URI
- https://doi.org/10.71548/16808
- Dc Identifier Other
-
opendissertations/8646
9661
4865465