Abstract
dc:descriptionThis dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. I find that the presence of certain types of block owners leads to a substantive constraint in the set of candidates that are willing to consider leading a firm, thus suggesting a substantial human capital cost to certain firm ownership structures.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- Brooks, Damien Alexander
- Contributors dc:contributor
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- Hadlock, Charles J.
- Booth, Geoffrey G.
- Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam
- Simonov, Andrei
Subjects
dc:subject × 3Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
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- In Copyright
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
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etd:3539
isbn:9781321993882
isbn:1321993889
oclc:933586761
umi:3719126
local:Brooks_grad.msu_0128D_13939 - OAI record oai:identifier
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