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Michigan State University

Essays in executive incentives and labor markets

Abstract

dc:description

This dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. I find that the presence of certain types of block owners leads to a substantive constraint in the set of candidates that are willing to consider leading a firm, thus suggesting a substantial human capital cost to certain firm ownership structures.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Brooks, Damien Alexander
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Hadlock, Charles J.
  • Booth, Geoffrey G.
  • Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam
  • Simonov, Andrei

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
etd:3539
isbn:9781321993882
isbn:1321993889
oclc:933586761
umi:3719126
local:Brooks_grad.msu_0128D_13939

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Michigan State University
Base URL
d.lib.msu.edu/oai
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Brooks, Damien Alexander. Essays in executive incentives and labor markets. 2015.