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The Open University

Logic and reality in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This study of the leading principles of Mill's empiricist metaphysics and philosophy of logic aims to provide accurate (and often revisionary) exegesis and criticism of his theories, and to show their pertinence to current philosophical debates. Mill's views on the attainment of knowledge by inference, the problems of suasive syllogisms, and the possibility of inductive inference are first discussed, and it is argued that his philosophy of logic is informed by a realist theory of error. Subsequently, attention is paid to his uncompromising rejection of a priori avenues to knowledge about objective reality, and his allegiance to a radical empiricist principle that all knowledge is of phenomena alone. A scrutiny of Mill's theories of the experienced world and of the experiencing self: brings the discussion; to the point at which it emerges clearly that there is a deep tension within his thought between a form of empiricism which approximates to a variety of scientific realism, and another which leans towards sensationalistic reductionism.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
phd
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
The Open University
Year dc:date.issued
1986

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Scarre, Geoffrey Francis

Rights

Language dc:language
en

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
The Open University
Base URL
oro.open.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Scarre, Geoffrey Francis. Logic and reality in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. doctoral thesis, The Open University, 1986.