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Elements of being: Reading Plato’s <i>Theaetetus</i> and <i>Sophist</i> as a critique of Wittgenstein’s <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In his <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>, Wittgenstein suggests that the logical atoms of his <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i> are similar to the primary elements of Socrates’ Dream in Plato’s <i>Theaetetus</i> (P.I. §46). I explore the texts in detail and argue that there are two key similarities between the <i>Tractatus</i> and the Dream: they both propose the existence of a single type of logical ‘atom’ and they both reject the object-property distinction. I suggest that Plato’s <i>Theaetetus</i> and <i>Sophist</i> are effectively two parts of one larger dialogue which can be read as a critique of <i>Tractatus</i>-type theories – theories that have object-only ontologies. I argue that Plato demonstrates that any theory lacking the object-property distinction will be unable to explain how strings of words are transformed into meaningful propositions about the world. Such theories relegate all propositions and mathematics to the class of nonsense. Wittgenstein acknowledges that, strictly speaking, the propositions of the <i>Tractatus</i> are nonsense (<i>TLP</i> 6.54); I show that the inexpressibility problem that Wittgenstein references is the same problem that Plato shows is faced by Heraclitus in the <i>Theaetetus</i> (183b). At the time of writing the <i>Tractatus</i>, Wittgenstein did not realise that <i>all</i> propositions, not just those of philosophy, like those in the <i>Tractatus</i>, were reduced to nonsense by his theory. Plato, on the other hand, foresaw the issues that any <i>Tractatus</i>-type theory would inevitably face, and resolved them in the <i>Sophist</i> with the introduction of a second type of logical atom with a different (metaphorical) shape. Different shapes account for how logical atoms combine to create propositions with unity. I argue that the version of logical atomism that Plato presents in the <i>Sophist</i> looks more Fregean than Tractarian. I discuss Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege, rejection of the idea of a second type of atom representing properties, and preference for necessarily featureless atoms. I conclude that this preference comes at too high a price.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
phd
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
The Open University
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Manning, Lucy Fay

Rights

Language dc:language
en

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
The Open University
Base URL
oro.open.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
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citation

Manning, Lucy Fay. Elements of being: Reading Plato’s <i>Theaetetus</i> and <i>Sophist</i> as a critique of Wittgenstein’s <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>. doctoral thesis, The Open University, 2023.