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University of South Florida

Employer Moral Hazard in Performance Evaluations: The Effects of Performance Measure Subjectivity and Justification on Employer Opportunism

Abstract

dc:description

Although organizations may use multiple types of performance measures when evaluating employee performance, such as objective and subjective measures, performance measure subjectivity can introduce unverifiable information on the employee side, giving rise to employer opportunistic behavior. Employers may use the unverifiable information within subjective performance measures to increase their own personal compensation by undercompensating evaluated employees, creating a control problem known as employer moral hazard. With a 2x2 multi-period experiment, this study investigates the effect employer moral hazard has on the allocation of employee bonus compensation when there are differing levels of objective and subjective performance measures and a requirement or no requirement to justify performance evaluation decisions to employees. Results of repeated measures ANOVA tests for the main hypothesis reveal that neither the performance measure type nor justification requirement manipulations have a significant effect on employee bonus compensation. Additional univariate, repeated measures, and mediation analyses reveal that when employer budget-based compensation incentives are present employees evaluated using mostly subjective performance measures receive less bonus compensation compared to employees evaluated using mostly objective performance measures due to perceptions of accountability to the evaluated employee being lower. Additional analyses also reveal employee undercompensation is reversed after the introduction of a justification requirement, as employers feel more accountable to evaluated employees and exert more effort in the justification to make performance evaluation decisions that are justifiable to the evaluated employees. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of employer moral hazard and the subsequent mitigation of employer moral hazard. Contributions and limitations are discussed.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Business Administration
Grantor
University of South Florida
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Miller, Chandler A.
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Uday Murthy, Ph.D.
  • Kristina Demek, Ph.D.
  • Carlos J. Angueira, Ph.D.
  • Joseph Vandello, Ph.D.

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language
EN-US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of South Florida
Base URL
digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Miller, Chandler A.. Employer Moral Hazard in Performance Evaluations: The Effects of Performance Measure Subjectivity and Justification on Employer Opportunism. Dissertation thesis, University of South Florida, 2024. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822