This dissertation consists of three essays. Essay 1: Delegation and Threat in Bargaining.Two principals ("nations") appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. Essay 2: Delegation of Bargaining and Power.Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy. Essay 3: Labor- and Product-Market Structure and Excess Labour.This study analyzes under what labor- and product-market structures a firm may hire more labor than needed to produce its profit maximizing output. Three labor-market structures are studied: (1) decentralized (firm-specific unions), (2) one-sided centralization (central union and several firms), and (3) centralized (central union and employers' association). Excess labor is explained by the risk-sharing motive that in the model exists between the risk-averse workers and the risk-neutral firm owner. Labor may be excessively hired in any of the labor-market structures and under a wide range of product-market structures; duopoly, oligopoly etc. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1998

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau, 1913. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [vii]-x).

Universiẗat, Diss., 2004--Münster (Westf.).

No description available.

In our society, American citizens expect public policies to result in programs that address social problems in ways that are both efficient and effective. In order to judge if these two values are being achieved, public programs are often scrutinized through program monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation of public programs often is a responsibility delegated to local-level managers. The resulting discretion has to be balanced with the need for accountability that is also inherent in public programs. Evaluation is often difficult because outcomes are not readily measurable due to the complexity of the problems faced in the public setting. The Upward Bound program provides an example of this. Upward Bound provides services to students from low-income families and those in which neither parent holds a bachelor’s degree in order to increase the rate at which participants complete secondary education and enroll in and graduate from postsecondary institutions. Upward Bound is implemented and evaluated based upon specifications decided upon at the local level. This discretion granted to local level managers has resulted in wide variations in the way the program is being evaluated. This presents a problem for evaluation and has resulted in inconclusive results as to the success of the program. One way to correct this problem is to try and gain a clear understanding of how the evaluation outcome measures are being chosen for Upward Bound. My study accomplished this task.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第25076号 / 経博第683号 / 新制||経||305(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 関口 格, 准教授 陳 珈惠, 教授 原 千秋 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DGAM

In grids, delegation is a key facility that can be used to authenticate and authorize requests on behalf of disconnected users. In current grid systems,delegation is either performed dynamically, in an unrestricted manner, or by a secure but static method. Unfortunately, the former compromises security and the latter cannot satisfy the requirements of dynamic grid application execution. Therefore, development of a delegation framework that enables a restricted and flexible delegation mechanism becomes increasingly urgent as grids are adopted by new communities and grow in size. The main barriers in development of such a mechanism are the requirements for dynamic execution of grid applications, which make it difficult to anticipate required access rights for completing tasks in advance. Another significant architectural requirement in grids is federated security and trust. A considerable barrier to achieving this is cross-organizational authentication and identification. Organizations participating in Virtual Organizations (VOs) may use different security infrastructures that implement different protocols for authentication and identification; thus, there exists a need to provide an architectural mechanism for lightweight, rapid and interoperable translation of security credentials from an original format to a format understandable by recipients. This thesis contributes the development of a delegation framework that utilizes a mechanism for determining and acquiring only required rights and credentials for completing a task, when they are needed. This is what we call an on-demand delegation framework that realizes a bottom-up delegation model and provides a just-in-time acquisition of rights for restricted and dynamic delegation. In this thesis, we further contribute the development of a credential mapping mechanism using off-the-shelf standards and technologies. This mechanism provides support for an on-the-fly exchange of different types of security credentials used by the security mechanisms of existing grids. / QC 20100622

To numerous laborer friends, pension fund is an important foundation which they rely heavily on for living after retirement. Since the start of the new pension fund system, management and manipulation of the fund becomes rather important. This article mainly focuses on the study of explicit delegation for designated management of the pension fund. It refers to relevant standards and probes to see if the management conforms to the requirement of the Constitution based on an explicit principle. Furthermore, it attempts to find out the similarities and dissimilarities between the two systems for law requirement on delegation for designated management. It also looks into the current delegation system to identify existing problems, and whether these problems such as deputy, systematic, and information opaque problems, are the causes of occurrence of unidentified problems. In addition, what is the standard of explicit delegation? What is the clear definition of contents, purpose, and scope of laws and regulations? Why information needed to be made known to the public? How delegation for designated management of the pension fund should be to correspond to the principle of explicit? What will be the consequences if principle of explicit is not corresponded with? These are the questions to be studied and discussed in this paper. This paper refers to and reviews the current operation modes of the United States, Singapore, and Hong Kong, hoping to gain experiences from these countries, and to take the experiences as a reference for Taiwan¡¦s implementation of the system. In conclusion, this paper provides a possible way of pension fund management based on the following premises: 1. establish a clear and definite achievements index system, 2. public information periodically, 3. set up mutual indemnity fund, 4. free selection and free switch, 5. issue index fund for laborers to choose.

Univ., Diss.--Zugl.: Paris.

No description available.