This thesis studies the nature of the ideas on federal government in the Canadian discussion of Confederation, 1864-1867. It is held that a federal state as such was not intended by the Canadian government, nor was it expected by the Canadian people. A federal state may be defined as a system of government wherein central and provincial authority is coordinate and independent, each of whose powers within a given legislative field are plenary. This thesis maintains that such a system of government was not what Canadians intended when they applied the word "federal" to the constitution framed at Quebec in October, 1864. What Canadians wanted was, by and large, a legislative union coupled with local guarantees for local rights and local privileges. Their intention was to form a strong central government and to relegate sectional issues to semi-dependent sectional institutions. Thus all the elements of strength in the existing legislative union were to be preserved, while the problems which had weakened the union would be removed by being taken up in the elasticity of of a "federal" system. In their consideration of a new constitution, Canadians turned instinctively to their own past experience in an essentially British system of government. The idea of legislative union remained predominant in the minds of Canadians. Quite simply, they preferred to walk in old paths as long as possible. Canadian ideas regarding federalism clearly reveal the limitations imposed by the Canadian political inheritance. The example of American federalism only reinforced Canadian prejudice. The effect of American ideas was largely to make Canadians cling the more uncritically to their own traditions of government. They saw in the United States disruptive forces clearly manifest in the Civil War. Federalism, they reasoned, was therefore dangerously centrifugal in its implications. Thus they sought rather to avoid federalism than to follow it. Canadians tended to follow the old way as much as possible. Undoubtedly the French required concessions and guarantees, but they were given no more than would be necessary to carry the project in Lower Canada. The intention of the Canadian cabinet reflects the basic feelings and the basic limitations of Canadians on the subject of federal government. This thesis attempts to show in detail the ideas regarding federalism which lay behind the policy of the Canadian government, to show by reference to contemporary opinion how deeply Confederation was rooted in Canadian experience and in British political tradition. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The nature of local-level political activity in the rural community of Bella Coola is shaped by the satellite relationship of the community to national and international economy, society and culture. Foremost, Bella Coola is economically a satellite in that (1) it lacks local capital and (2) all the products and nearly all the profit of local industry leave the valley. It is not within the power of the local community members to make major economic decisions. Rather, they must constantly respond to external initiatives. Bella Coola occupies a satellite position in regard to formal social institutions in that the community itself supplies only the lowest level functionaries and workers. Its members have no control on major social policy and implementation. Bella Coola is a cultural satellite in that its members do not participate in the creation of the dominant culture but rather consume it. Local ideals of the good life, music, art, drama, and technical implements are all independent of local creation. The satellite nature of Bella Coola affects local level political activity in (1) regard to goals that succeed and (2) leadership and participation. The political goals that succeed in Bella Coola are those that increase access to the economic, social, and cultural centre (the metropolis). Successful local level political leaders come from those occupations that provide the highest contact with persons and institutions outside the community. / Arts, Faculty of / Anthropology, Department of / Graduate

This study is a prosopographical analysis of the Russian Committee of Ministers during the entire period of its existence, 1802 to 1905. Because the Committee was comprised of the highest officials within the Russian bureaucracy, its membership constituted a precisely defined elite group. Examination of the social and career backgrounds of the Committee's members allows for quantitatively grounded descriptions of the administrative elite, of the Russian Empire and the changes it underwent through the course of the nineteenth century. On the whole, the members of the Committee of Ministers are found to have been largely of Russian nationality, while Germans composed a sizable minority. The social class which dominated the Committee was the nobility, with few ministers not of noble or royal birth. Relative to the general population, the ministers also formed an educational elite, a majority of whom were schooled in an institution of higher learning. As a group the ministers had no other occupational activity than service to the Russian state, with ninety per cent of the ministers having entered state service immediately upon finishing their education. In their official careers the ministers spent over three decades in service before attaining membership on the Committee of Ministers, and most of them served in the military as well as the civil area of Russian government. While most of the ministers held only one position on the Committee of Ministers, a large minority held more than two, either simultaneously or consecutively; and the overall average for tenure in membership in one position was six years. While these features were determined for the entire membership of the Committee of Ministers, pictures of the Committee as constituted under each of the five tsars of the nineteenth century differed from each other, with Nicholas I's ministers most resembling the portrait drawn above. Through the course of four reigns, the base of the Committee's social composition widened somewhat to include groups of more diverse backgrounds, and the career pattern of simultaneous military and civil service shifted towards one of solely bureaucratic service in the civil administration. The importance of higher education as a qualification for elite status worked to moderate the influence of inherited social position, and the groups who most benefitted from this tendency were ministers of foreign, non-noble, and German birth, whose generally high level of educational attainment was suited to the needs of the expanding Russian bureaucracy. Under Alexander III, these changes were most in evidence within the Committee's membership, but in the following reign, under Nicholas II, the old patterns reasserted themselves as the percentages of landed nobility and militarily trained ministers increased. This resurgence of traditionally dominant patterns reflects the landed nobility's efforts to retain old privileges and to regain their former eminence, which had been undermined in 1861 by the emancipation of the serfs. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis applies the analytical concept of political culture to politics in the Indonesian context. The term "Javanization" is used to describe the process whereby ethnic Javanese and Javanized individuals gradually became the overwhelming and disproportionate majority of the governing elite in the post-independence era. It is further argued that the dominance in terms of numbers has led to the Javanization of Indonesian conceptions of state and limits of political behavior. The first chapter surveys other theories of Indonesian politics and makes a proposal for a cultural theory. The cultural cleavages in Indonesian society in the horizontal plane are described and a description of the government of Mataram operating in a totally Javanese environment is given. The changing roles of the primary bearers of Javanese political culture and the nature of the state are discussed. Chapter Two interprets post-independence political history from the perspective of increasing Javanization and the gradual loss of national political influence by non-Javanese Islamic political elements. Data on the ethnic composition of the contemporary military, governmental and political elite are presented. Chapter Three is a discussion of contemporary (1959 to I972) Indonesian government and politics using the same conceptual framework (structure, functions and style) as is used to discuss Mataram. Some similarities and dis-similarities are pointed out. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the future of Javanization. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The establishment of coalition governments by international accords as a means to end internationalized civil wars has not been sufficiently analyzed to date. At this time, this process is of particular importance since it has been proposed as a mechanism to end the internationalized war in Vietnam and Indochina. The purpose of this study is to examine whether, in fact, the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam is a likely possibility for the near future. The method used to consider this problem was to first isolate a group of general factors which appear supportive of the establishment of coalition governments by international accords utilizing the case studies of Cyprus and Laos. This list of factors also includes those factors which appear necessary for the successful operation of a coalition government. Thus Chapter I is devoted to a description of the factors which appeared pertinent to the establishment of the coalitions in Cyprus and Laos, and the development of a set of what the author has termed "coalition criteria." Chapter II then examines the particular internal and international environments surrounding the case of South Vietnam. The internal environment is described in terms of the division of forces in South Vietnam into major sociopolitical groups and the types of emerging relationships amongst these forces. The implications of the Vietnamese concept of coalition and accommodation are also considered. The international environment is analyzed in terms of the policies of the major external parties involved in Vietnam, and the effect of the changing relationships between the US and China and the US and Russia. The final chapter of this study examines the major factors impinging on the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam in terms of the general factors established in Chapter I as relevant to the creation of coalition governments by international accords, and the particularities of the South Vietnamese case discussed in Chapter II. The conclusion of the author is that the establishment of some form of coalition government in South Vietnam by international accords is a likely possibility and that such a coalition could be a satisfactory, though probably temporary, solution for ending the armed conflict in Indochina. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Perestroika, unlike previous attempts at economic reform, represents the beginning of a new era in post-war Soviet politics. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. To illustrate the uniqueness of perestroika, this thesis is structured around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, political, and social reforms with those of Nikita Khrushchev. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to determine the uniqueness of perestroika and to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first-post Stalin reformer is examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, it is to be expected that they should share certain common objectives. But the similarities are far less significant than the differences. The differences between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a function both of substantive policy differences and historical circumstance. Historical Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the Soviet Union was weak relative to the United States. Externally, the most pressing need was for the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Internally, Khrushchev's first years were ones of struggle for absolute leadership with other Politburo figures who had differing notions of reform. The world that Brezhnev and his successors bequeathed to Gorbachev bore little resemblance to the one which Stalin left to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union had become the military equal of the United States. Political Reform Khrushchev's main objective was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy largely in order to enhance his own personal power. Gorbachev's focus is less Stalin than it is the Stalinist system. The lack of subordination of political and economic reform to the pursuit of personal one-man rule marks perestzoika as a distinct improvement over de-Stalinization. Economic Reform In economic policy, Khrushchev followed Stalin's practice of meeting economic problems with administrative measures. Although Khrushchev made his reputation by denouncing Stalin's leadership, he did nothing to address the root of the Soviet Union's troubles—the Stalinist economic system. Perestroika is theoretically superior to de-Stalinization because Gorbachev eschews administrative tinkering in favour of economic change. Gorbachev has rediscovered the co-operative socialism and limited tolerance for free-enterprise of the 1920s. The implication of this return to 'Leninism' is an admission that the Stalinist system is a failure. CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and their subsequent failure, can be traced to his fixation with appearance over substance. For all of his 'liberal' reforms, Khrushchev is essentially a 'Stalinist' politician. Perestzoika is superior to de-Stalinization both because of historical circumstance and substantive philosophical differences. Gorbachev's return to Leninist principles effectively ends the period of reformed Stalinism. But the objective need for reform does imply its necessary success. There are many obstacles to effecting deep change in the Soviet Union, obstacles which cannot be surmounted soon. It cannot be expected that a people will cast off the habits of a lifetime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are rigorous and potentially longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not really address the flaws of the Soviet system. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

City-regions have emerged as a critical focus of economic activity, governance and social organization as a result of the ongoing processes of economic restructuring. Canadian city-regions are limited in their capacity to respond to contemporary problems due to the functional and structural limitations of outdated governing systems. The Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) is a system of voluntary cooperation among twenty-one local municipalities. While this model has served the city-region well, its limits have been reached in terms of its ability to deliver necessary region-wide policy responses. Economic development, a crucial policy issue for urban regions, is characterized by vague and ill-functioning relationships and by poorly-defined policies and programs between the member municipalities and the regional tier. The GVRD is constrained by the fact that it can only do what is delegated by its members, and decisions are often compromised in order to suit conflicting local interests that exist throughout the region. A new governing model for the city-region should foster a regional vision, and should be appropriate for the responsibilities the city-region is expected to fulfill in this era of global competition. A single-tier government is the most appropriate model for Greater Vancouver, allowing comprehensive regional planning and innovative economic development to be carried out with a strong regional voice, and for decisions to be made with a greater degree of certainty, preserving the livability and economic health of Canada's fastest-growing city-region. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Community and Regional Planning (SCARP), School of / Graduate

The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and development of Western Kamerun nationalism. Some of the factors which shaped the events connected with that phenomenon can be traced' back to the pre-colonial period. Others emerged from the activities of the colonizers in the region during the colonial and trust period. But, it was against the British activities that a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, the political leaders, reacted and, in the 1940s, developed a nationalist movement. In 1953, these new leaders, who had made little headway in their demands of the British, involved the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, in the nationalist movement. The a-Fon who commanded the loyalty and support of most of the region's inhabitants, significantly strengthened and influenced the movement henceforth. During that crucial period, however, the movement witnessed several conflicts over policy regarding the future of Western Kamerun. In Northern Kamerun, the local authorities advocated integration with Nigeria while some dissident local Fulani and the a-Fon demanded secession from it. In Southern Kamerun, some political leaders stressed integration with Nigeria, others favoured secession from it and ultimate reunification of Kamerun, and, yet, others emphasized immediate secession and reunification. On the other hand, the a-Fon requested secession without reunification. Thus, there were fundamental differences among the political leaders and between them and the traditional rulers. During this period, the political leaders defined and redefined their varying programmes in an effort to win over the Crowned Princes who refused to budge. Realizing the firmness of the a-Fon, backed by massive support from the electorate, the organizers concentrated their efforts at the United Nations where they manipulated, confused, and engineered a split within its members. The division within the United Nations and among the organizers forced that organization to concentrate on reaching a compromise rather than finding out what the majority of the Western Kamerunians desired. The outcome of this approach was adverse decisions: in the case of Northern Kamerun, where the electorate, after the first plebiscite, had mistaken the reformed local administration for secession from Nigeria, the United Nations refused to postpone the second plebiscite, and, in the case of Southern Kamerun, it left out secession without reunification, the most popular view, from the plebiscite despite numerous appeals and protests from both regions. In the ensuing confusion in the North and dissatisfaction in the South, the electorate asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscites, interpreting the United Nations' questions to suit their local conditions and circumstances. This interpreting process was to be expected. In most plebiscites and elections, electors ask and answer their own questions, often with little reference to the larger issues, but the timing of the second plebiscite in the North and the unfortunate wording of the plebiscite questions in the context of politics in the South, contributed not only a good deal of confusion to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determination. Moreover, the conduct of the plebiscites, themselves, was characterized by the abuse of power by those interested groups in and out of authority, and by suspicion and accusation which were sometimes justifiable and sometimes not. Furthermore, the plebiscite undermined the Concert of the Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, and left sections of the region standing at a distance from, and threatening, each other. Not only had the trust system ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note, but the United Nations had been less than effective in applying the principle of self-determination. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

José Martí (1853-1895) is commonly accepted by Cubans and foreigners alike as the creator of the Republic of Cuba. No such agreement exists as to the meaning of his social and political thought: Martí has been represented as advocating the most diverse of political, social and economic theories. The two most common interpretations are of Martí as an idealistic liberal or as a radical revolutionary. The prolixity and variety of Martí's writings permit the selection of direct quotations to support virtually any pre-determined ideological interpretation, and in Cuban politics over the last forty years Martí's writings have been used to legitimise totally opposing political regimes. An escape from such a treatment of Martí's writings is clearly essential if his thoughtvis to be properly understood, since only a fresh, objective examination of the totality of Martí 's writings and, in particular, an investigation of Martí's plans for the independent Cuba he so long and nobly struggled to liberate, will give an understanding of Martí's thought and its development. Based upon a close examination of the twenty-five volumes of the most recent edition of Martí's writings and upon a careful analysis of all significant critical studies of Martí's works, this dissertation has concentrated upon analysing Martí's socio-political thought and particularly his plans for the liberated patria. The dissertation also seeks .to explain the sources of Martí's thought and to investigate the development, if any, that occurred in his thought over a period of some twenty-five years. The extraordinary importance of Martí's childhood and adolescence is considered in Chapter I which demonstrates how decisive in the formation of his thought were his experiences both within his family and during his savage mistreatment by the Spanish authorities. Chapter II investigates the importance of his personal experience during his adult life in Latin America and in the United States and shows how these experiences led to a further development and, in his final years, to a radicalisation of his thought. The following four chapters contain an analysis of Martí's plans for the liberated Cuban Republic. Each chapter concentrate's upon a' specific aspect of these plans—the "moral imperatives" guiding the new Republic, its political structure, its social organisation, and its economic development. These chapters reveal that, if Martí did not present specific blueprints, he did adopt a coherent approach to the formation of the new Republic-and the problems it would face. His plans were based upon moral priorities rather than upon any abstract theory of government and society. The Conclusion restates the main findings of the dissertation,' underlining the uniqueness of Martí, a man capable of inspiring, more than sixty years after his death, a new vision of Cuban society. The dissertation closes with two appendices, one summarising biographical details of Martí's life, and the other analysing the historical portrayal of Martí who has visibly passed from the position of "Apostle" to that of "Revolutionary." / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate

Bibliography: pages 381-191. / Eight years after Transkei has been granted independence, the independent states have become an important component of the South African political landscape, and their existence cannot be ignored despite the fact that no other country but South Africa has recognised their independence. This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the choice of independence. The reasons are examined which led the South African government to grant independence to the homelands, and those which induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it. An evaluation is made of the political and economic benefits and lack thereof this choice has brought to those who made it and to their communities, with a view to the role the independent states may play in future developments in South Africa. A descriptive-analytical approach has been adopted and the main subjects have been presented in their chronological unfolding, in order to stress the basic continuity in the aims pursued both on the part of the South African government and on the part of the homeland leaders, despite numerous tactical adaptations to the circumstances on both sides. Most of the information has been gathered from the Hansard of the House and from reports of various commissions and government White Papers. Official documents from the independent states and the economic corporations working therein have also been extensively used. Other information and data have been gathered during a period of fieldwork in Ciskei and Transkei and through a number of interviews. The time passed since the granting of independence to the homelands which opted for it is still too short for an exhaustive evaluation of the effects this choice had for their population. It is however possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions regarding the effects the independent states will have in the evolution of the political situation in South Africa. The most important is that they are here to stay, bar a total defeat of the white government in an all-out war, and that they may be a factor in a still possible peaceful solution of the South African problems.