Thesis (M.S.)--Wisconsin State University, La Crosse, 1971. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 25).

American prisoner of war (POW) policy consists of repeated improvisational efforts during wartime followed by few efforts to incorporate lessons learned. As such, in every war, the United States has improvised its system of POW maintenance and utilization. At no time prior to World War II was the United States military prepared to capture and maintain the prisoners taken in any American conflict. The United States has depended upon reciprocal treatment of enemy prisoners and threatened retaliation for mistreatment of American captives in every war. It has also adhered to accepted customs and international law regarding prisoners, providing housing, food, and medical care to POWs at least the equal of that given to American prisoners. However, the U.S. military has often sought the most expedient methods of maintaining prisoners, a practice that has led to accusations of neglect. In the nineteenth century, American wars were typically fought upon the North American continent and were limited in scope, which facilitated the maintenance of enemy prisoners and eased the improvisation of policy and practice. In the twentieth century, the United States participated in conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, complicating POW issues. World War II and subsequent conflicts show a radical departure from earlier wars, as the army planned for the capture of enemy troops and was better prepared to maintain them. However, the War on Terror represents a return to improvisation, as a lack of planning and a failure to follow established policies contributed to allegations of mistreatment in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.

A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

<p>Includes bibliographic references (leaves 184-195)&quot / In this thesis, I contrast Qutbs approach towards jihad with that which is found in the primary sources of Islam and as espoused by the proponents of the four schools of thought, as well as key Islamic scholars. This study also attempts to explore the conceptual confusion between terrorism, jihad, and legitimate defense and resistance by comparing the legislation on jihad in Islam with that which exists in international law and conventions. I then turn my attention to the focal point of this study, the writings of Sayyid Qutb on jihad...&quot / </p>

This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the duration of war and the duration of postwar peace. The first essay studies both durations jointly, with a particular focus on the interdependence between the two processes. It demonstrates that membership in security organizations can prolong the durability of peace after conflict, but that the expected longer peace after conflict can also prolong the duration of conflict. The second essay analyzes the duration of war in a greater detail, exploring how third-party actors influence the process. It shows that balanced intervention can shorten the duration until a negotiated settlement is reached between the disputants. The third essay looks at the stability of postwar peace by focusing on the strength of cease-fire agreements. It argues that stronger agreements can maintain longer peace after wars by helping the disputants resolve the bargaining problems. The statistical analysis that corrects for the endogeneity of agreement strength provides support for the argument.

Recent terrorist events (e.g., London, Madrid, and Bombay train bombings), as well as the attacks on September 11, 2001, have highlighted the impact casualties can have on domestic audiences. These incidents led to major foreign policy shifts, massive security expenditures, and the removal of an incumbent government (i.e., Spain). Yet, when we compare the number of those killed in terrorist events to those killed in militarized disputes, there are more negative public responses to casualties of terrorism than to militarized disputes. My dissertation examines this “over reaction” by comparing reactions to different casualty contexts. The comparison of casualties across different hostility contexts is a unique contribution to the field. I posit a model in which the characteristics of the casualty event generate emotional reactions. The emotional response affects the way information about the event is processed by individuals, and alters individual’s support of aggressive/non-aggressive foreign policies. Furthermore, my model proposes that different types of negative emotions have different impacts on the process, as well as on the preferences for distinct foreign policies. I expect that different casualty characteristics such as the hostility context (terrorism and militarized disputes) and the characteristics of the targets (number killed and their identity) influence the specific negative emotions experienced by individuals. Thus, variations in these characteristics should alter public preferences for foreign policies. I use a multi-method approach to test my theoretical propositions. First, I utilize experimental methods that introduce different scenarios to the participants. Each scenario varies the casualty characteristics, and measures individual preferences for foreign policies. Second, I compiled a daily event data set that contains both terrorism and militarized dispute casualty statistics and public reaction data for Israel in 1969. This period provides wide variations along the independent variables. My results support the idea that casualty characteristics play a pivotal role in emotional responses to these events as well as in how individuals respond to casualty events. This work is unique in that it examined the role of the number of casualties in conjunction with the context in which they occur and who those casualties are.

A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

This dissertation analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean conflict. Using evidence from primary sources such as Truman’s presidential papers, communications of White House staffers, and correspondence from State Department operatives and key congressional figures, this study suggests that the legislative branch had an important role in Korean policy. Congress sometimes affected the war by what it did and, at other times, by what it did not do. Several themes are addressed in this project. One is how Truman and the congressional Democrats failed each other during the war. The president did not dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term, and was slow to react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically. For their part, the Democrats gave HST poor advice concerning congressional involvement in the decision to take the nation to war. A number of them allowed their personal dislike for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to poison their support for the administration whenever U.S. fortunes in the war soured. Another issue was Truman’s interpretation and use of the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy. HST generally manipulated the idea for political advantage. Ironically, had he listened to the counsel of an administration Republican early in the war, Truman could have mitigated the explosion over the firing of General Douglas MacArthur. A topic heretofore overlooked by historians concerns congressional peace initiatives proposed during the first half of the war. Analysis of the effectiveness of these resolutions, particularly during the heyday of McCarthyism, yields surprising conclusions.

American prisoner of war (POW) policy consists of repeated improvisational efforts during wartime followed by few efforts to incorporate lessons learned. As such, in every war, the United States has improvised its system of POW maintenance and utilization. At no time prior to World War II was the United States military prepared to capture and maintain the prisoners taken in any American conflict. The United States has depended upon reciprocal treatment of enemy prisoners and threatened retaliation for mistreatment of American captives in every war. It has also adhered to accepted customs and international law regarding prisoners, providing housing, food, and medical care to POWs at least the equal of that given to American prisoners. However, the U.S. military has often sought the most expedient methods of maintaining prisoners, a practice that has led to accusations of neglect. In the nineteenth century, American wars were typically fought upon the North American continent and were limited in scope, which facilitated the maintenance of enemy prisoners and eased the improvisation of policy and practice. In the twentieth century, the United States participated in conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, complicating POW issues. World War II and subsequent conflicts show a radical departure from earlier wars, as the army planned for the capture of enemy troops and was better prepared to maintain them. However, the War on Terror represents a return to improvisation, as a lack of planning and a failure to follow established policies contributed to allegations of mistreatment in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.

The just war tradition as we know it has its origins with Christian theology. In this dissertation, I examine the theological, in particular ontological, presuppositions of St. Augustine of Hippo in his elucidation of just war. By doing so, I show how certain metaphysical ideas of St. Augustine (especially those on existence, love, and the sovereignty of God) shaped the just war tradition. Following this, I examine the slow evacuation of his metaphysics from the just war tradition. Through the systemization of just war by St. Thomas Aquinas, aided later on by Bartolomé de Las Casas and Hugo Grotius, the doctrine became a shadowy reflection of the tradition. By analyzing the notions of morality in warfare by political realists (Waltz, Morgenthau), international law, and liberal thinkers (Rawls, Walzer), I show the incoherence of the doctrine when it is separated from its ontological and metaphysical roots.