No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

It is the contention of this thesis that the Tripartite Alliance came at the end of a period during which Britain and Turkey attempted to reconcile their often conflicting interests in order to ensure common security in the Near East. Between 1934-1939, contrary to the usual belief, the dynamics of Anglo-Turkish relations most often led Turkey to seek a formal relationship, which Britain, for reasons of its own, was reluctant to grant. Once conceded, in May 1939, with the proclamation of the Joint Guarantee, the fledgling Anglo-Turkish condominium promptly began to sicken, and by June 1940, had failed altogether. The primary reasons for this collapse were four. Firstly, the political under-pinnings of the alliance never seemed sufficient to permit either partner to consider advantageous the activation of the alliance once made. Secondly, the Alliance was afflicted by certain powerful dilemmas within Britain's global strategy which prevented British planners from coming to any lasting consensus regarding Turkey's role in imperial defence. Thirdly, if the alliance were to be made effective, sufficient and timely assistance--chiefly, material and economic assistance--would have to be provided the Turkish partner. During this early period, both Britain and France remained unable or unwilling to provide anything like the level of assistance required. Finally, the numerous inter-allied Staff conversations, which were a principle feature of the Alliance's early years, failed to produce a single viable option for the fruitful deployment of common forces against any possible enemy. Without such a plan, the entry of Turkey to the war would have been worse than ill-advised; it would have been pointless. / Once the Alliance had definitely foundered on these rocks, in the infinitely more menacing conditions existing after June 1940, it was entirely unlikely that Turkey would permit the activation of an alliance no longer consistent, by any reading, with its essential interests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)